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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform,
expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the
nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such
as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading
to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses
new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the
consequences for mortality rates.
The first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure,
and analyzes the factors that determined towns’ willingness to invest. The results show the
importance of towns’ financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access
to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by
Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little
evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government
public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower
levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to
vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using
plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support
the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the
franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the
right to vote.
vii
Chapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high
mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban
expenditure on sanitation—water supply, sewer systems and streets—was extremely effective
in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Sanitation infrastructure is critical to public health. Yet, government investment in sanita-
tion remains insufficient in many countries: in 2010 dirty water alone was estimated to have
killed more people than all forms of violence, including war, combined (Corcoran, 2010).
There is thus a pressing need to understand the political difficulties that impede government
sanitation investment and how countries have been able to overcome those obstacles in the
past.
This thesis examines the political economy of sanitation investment in Victorian Britain.
Britain in the nineteenth-century faced challenges similar to those in developing countries to-
day, with industrialization leaving a trail of deteriorating sanitary environments in its wake.
A growing movement for sanitary reform faced intense opposition from taxpayers unwilling
to fund much needed new infrastructure, leading to inefficiently low levels of investment
in “social infrastructure” (Williamson, 2002). To understand the opposition to sanitation
expenditure, we have to analyze local government, since it was locally elected town councils
that held responsibility for maintaining sanitary environments. We often overlook the impor-
tant role of local governments in building and maintaining infrastructure, in part due to the
difficulty in collecting data when compared to well-developed national accounts, but by doing
so we miss a key component of the development of the scope and size of the modern state.
Further, local government data has the additional advantage of allowing political economy
2models to be tested within a single country setting, avoiding the difficulties associated with
cross-country regressions.
The thesis is comprised of three separate papers, each of which utilizes a new annual
dataset of town-level accounts for all urban areas in England and Wales between 1867 and
1910. In Chapter 2, I analyze whether the decentralization of spending authority to town
councils increased sanitation investment. Critically, town councils had to rely on local taxes
to fund their sanitation expenditure. This financial burden led to resistance from local tax-
payers, with many towns spending nothing on key sanitation items as much as 40 years after
town councils were given control of expenditure in the 1848 Public Health Act. I then show
that democratic reforms in 1894, which implemented the secret ballot and removed multiple
votes for wealthier citizens, did not overcome this unwillingness to spend. I implement a
difference-in-difference analysis, using the fact that some town councils had been elected
under this more democratic system since 1835 to construct a control group. I find that the
extension of political power to poorer citizens reduced both the level of expenditure on water
supply and revenue from taxes, suggesting that democratic reform inhibited the expansion
of the role of state to encompass infrastructure investment.
In Chapter 3 I delve deeper into the effects of extending voting rights. Many theories
of democratization suggest that extending the right to vote will lead to increased govern-
ment expenditure (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2000). However, these models frequently assume that government can engage in
transfer expenditure, which is often not true for local governments, and was not the case in
nineteenth-century Britain. I present and test a model of government expenditure on public
goods where government does not hold power to implement redistributive transfers. The
model predicts that the poor and the rich desire lower public goods expenditure than the
middle class: the rich because of the relatively high tax burden, and the poor because of a
high marginal utility of consumption. Consequently extensions of the franchise to the poor
3can be associated with declines in government expenditure on public goods. The empirical
analysis exploits plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise in 150 towns to
identify the effects of extending voting rights to the poor. The results show strong support
for the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of
the franchise, but fell following extensions of the franchise beyond around 50% of the adult
male population.
In Chapter 4 I test how effective sanitation expenditure was in reducing mortality from
two waterborne diseases—cholera and diarrhea. Linking the financial data to registration
information specifying mortality rates, I find that sanitation spending was very effective in
reducing mortality from waterborne disease. This result suggests that the taxpayer opposi-
tion analyzed in the previous chapters had extremely costly effects on public health—it did
not merely prevent wasteful or corrupt expenditure.
4Chapter 2
The political economy of sanitation ex-
penditure
2.1 Introduction
The role of the British state changed radically between 1848 and 1900. Over this period,
government became responsible for provision of new urban infrastructure—including clean
water supply, waste disposal and electric lighting—and for a growing range of public health
services. However it was not the national government that built this critical infrastructure.
Rather, it was locally elected town councils that were charged with both raising the funds to
pay for sanitation, and deciding how those funds should be spent to best improve sanitary
environments.
In this chapter I analyze whether the political decentralization in Britain was successful in
increasing expenditure on sanitary public goods, including water supply, sewer systems and
paved roads. The analysis shows that the central government faced considerable difficulties
in convincing local councils to increase spending despite significant health benefits—as shown
in Chapter 4, this infrastructure was critical to reducing mortality from waterborne disease.
I then test whether these problems were a consequence of a local governance structure that
was biased in favor of wealthy citizens in many towns. The results suggest that, in fact, the
5opposite was true: as democratic reform gave the poor greater political power there was a
reduction in both important expenditure and in associated tax revenue. While democratic
reform may contribute to the growth of social spending by national government (Lindert,
2004), this finding indicates that democratic change may have inhibited the expansion of the
role of the state in other, equally important, ways.
To test the effects of democratic reform, I use a new dataset of sanitary expenditure
in approximately 700 town councils between 1872 and 1904; plus earlier data regarding lo-
cal government activities undertaken under the terms of the 1848 Public Health Act. This
dataset allows me to identify the financial constraints faced by local governments and to ana-
lyze the success of attempts by the Westminster Parliament to encourage local governments
to spend effectively. Many towns failed to make significant investments in infrastructure
despite being granted significant powers—from 1848 onward towns were able, at a low cost,
to obtain the authority to raise taxes and invest in improvements to their local environment.
By 1872, fewer than 50% of towns were spending any money at all on sewer systems and even
fewer were spending on water supply. The imposition of requirements that towns improve
sanitary environments in the 1870s did lead to an increase in nationwide expenditure, but
many towns continued to spend very small amounts on sanitation.
To test whether this failure to invest was a consequence of limited democracy—for in-
stance due to elite capture—I use the fact that the governance structure of the councils
that controlled sanitation expenditure varied across different towns and over time. While
in some towns the system was relatively democratic, with a secret ballot and a system of
one vote per head of household, in other towns the franchise was graduated, with wealthier
citizens holding multiple votes. In 1894 this system was standardized by the 1894 Local
Government Act, providing an exogenous institutional change. I use this Act of Parliament
as the treatment event in a difference-in-difference analysis, where the control group con-
sists of a matched sample of towns that had a democratic governance structure prior to this
6date. The results show little evidence that democratic governance led to greater expenditure
on sanitation infrastructure. Rather, the findings suggest that in fact the move to a more
democratic system, and hence the extension of political power to poorer citizens reduced per
capita expenditure on water supply and per capita tax receipts.
What might explain this result? The answer may lie in the important financial constraints
faced by town councils during this period and, in particular, their reliance on raising revenue
through local taxation (Millward and Sheard, 1995). Taxpayers bore much of the burden
of greater expenditure—the results show that the taxable wealth of the district was critical
in determining the level of spending. In other words, an important barrier to investment
was that citizens were limited in their ability to redistribute across the country. I find that
significant growth in spending occurred once government grants gave towns greater ability
to share the costs of maintaining and improving local roads.
Importantly, however, towns were also limited in their ability to redistribute between
their own citizens since they were constrained in the scope of the taxes they could raise.
Taxes could only be raised on property—not profits or income—and only a proportional tax
rate could be used. As a result, the vast majority of households were expected to pay tax,
meaning that poorer citizens had to “pay” for greater government spending on public goods.
The fact they faced these costs could explain the negative effect of democratic reform—I
analyze this argument in more detail in Chapter 3.
2.2 Data
I begin by describing the dataset that I use throughout the remainder of the paper. The
data consists of two major parts: the financial data relating to annual town revenue and
expenditure; and demographic information drawn from decennial censuses. I discuss each in
turn below, and define some key variables used in the later empirical work.
72.2.1 Financial data
Data sources
The main part of the dataset relates to the annual accounts of all the urban councils re-
sponsible for sanitary expenditure between 1867 and 1904 reported in the Local Taxation
Returns as part of the Parliamentary Papers.1 These accounts were reported by Parliament
in annual documents throughout this period, and provide a detailed disaggregation of the
sources of revenue and types of expenditure in each town. A panel dataset was constructed
by hand-matching towns between years to account for variations in place names over time.
I also utilize information from other reports for specific purposes; these are cited in the
appropriate location throughout the text. To construct the variables used in the analysis
I transform the nominal financial values into real terms using the Rousseaux Price Index,
obtained from Mitchell (1971, pp. 723–4), following Millward and Sheard (1995).
Variables
Sanitary expenditure
The focus of our analysis is “sanitary expenditure”, defined as the combination of water sup-
ply, sewer systems and expenditure on streets and highways. This latter category is included
for three reasons. First, the paving of streets can have a direct sanitary impact since it
affects the ease of cleaning streets and because it was sometimes associated with slum clear-
ance (Baird, 1886; Millward and Sheard, 1995). Further, this category of expenditure also
included activities such as street cleaning and “scavenging” (collection of refuse). In places
I group these categories together because it is not clear whether the towns are consistent
in their separation between these different categories, and in some cases spending on (for
instance) water and sewers is explicitly combined together. This is particularly true before
1A full list of the papers used is available from the author upon request.
81884, when the organization of the accounts improved significantly.
A further complication with the financial variables is that before 1884 loan expenditure is
not distinguished from current expenditure and, consequently, it is not possible to separate
investment expenditure from ongoing expenditure. As a result, in the regressions below
I focus predominantly on the period after 1884. To account for both current and loan
expenditure I spread expenditure out of loans over the period, by assuming an amortization
of 1/25 of the loan each period. That is, our independent variable is:
OngoingExpendi,t = CurrentExpendi,t +
(
t∑
s=1884
LoanExpendi,s
)
/25
Revenue
I use three measures of receipts in the analysis. Tax receipts are measured as the total
revenue from property taxes (the “rates”) for each town. Towns varied according to the
type of rate they levied for the same purpose, and as such I aggregate them into a single
variable. Second, I include the revenue from property, including both rents and property
sales.2 The third revenue measure relates to the receipts from other authorities—including
both the central government and county councils. Revenue from county councils is separated
into two parts: those from the “Exchequer Account” and “Other”—predominantly consisting
of payments for main roads. Since the latter is particularly interesting for our analysis, I
would ideally separate between the two. Unfortunately the accounts do not do this for non-
municipal boroughs from 1898 onward. As such, I estimate this variable by assuming that
the percentage of the total receipts from the County Council accounted for by the “Other”
category remains constant for each town after this point.
Rateable value per capita
The dataset includes the rateable value—that is the value of the property tax base—for the
majority of years in the dataset. I use a three year rolling average to smooth changes due
2These sources of revenue are not consistently separated in the accounts.
9to re-ratings, and linearly interpolate missing years.3
Loans outstanding and interest rates
From 1883 onwards the reports identify the stock of loans outstanding separated by category
(water supply, sewers, etc.). This data can be used as a measure of the stock of investment by
each local authority, given the importance of borrowing in funding investment (see discussion
in the following section). In addition, we can use the total stock of loans outstanding to
provide a crude estimate of the cost of borrowing to each local authority. In particular, I
estimate the average interest rate using the following formula:
Average Interesti,t =
ExpendInteresti,t
(LoansOutstandingi,t + LoansOutstandingi,t−1)/2
That is, the average interest rate is calculated by dividing the expenditure on interest in
year t by the estimated average value of loans outstanding during period t. Data on annual
interest payments is available for the period 1887-1903 for all towns.4
This measure suffers from two concerns. First, the measure may include the interest rate
paid on relatively old loans, and hence may not reflect the current interest cost facing a
town. However, problems of this sort are likely to be small since towns could refinance loans
at lower interest rate once the current cost of borrowing dropped (Bellamy, 1988). Secondly,
the measure can only be estimated for towns that have loans outstanding at the end of the
relevant year. This could lead to considerable selection bias since towns with higher average
interest rates are likely to be less likely to borrow.
In order to separate trends specific to local governments from general changes in the cost
of borrowing I also include a measure of the long run rate of interest—the adjusted yield on
British consols reported in Mitchell (1971, p. 678).
3This information is missing for the year 1883 for municipal boroughs; and for isolated years for other
towns. Municipal boroughs sometimes reported a separate rateable value as borough authorities and as
sanitary authorities: I use the maximum of the two.
4For non-municipal boroughs it is also available for the year 1904.
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2.2.2 Demographic data
Information regarding town population and the number of houses in each town is drawn
from the reports of the decennial census between 1851 and 1911. Information for the years
1851–1901 was collected directly for the purposes of this project. For the 1911 census I use
the parish-level data coded previously by Southall (2004) and stored at the UK data archive.
In addition to these demographic variables, I use information from the 1881 census to
identify the occupational structure of each town. A 100% sample of the 1881 census is
available from the North Atlantic Population Project (Minnesota Population Center, 2008;
Schu¨rer and Woollard, 2003). This dataset identifies the occupation, age, labor force status
and place of birth for each resident. I use this dataset to identify the proportion of the work
force in various occupations, including agriculture, textiles, domestic service, and mining; as
well as the proportion of the population that are foreign born in each town.
Unfortunately, the census does not identify the current town of residence; rather it identi-
fies the parish and registration sub-district in which each individual lives. I therefore match
each town to registration sub-districts in the 1881 census. In some cases, the town falls
entirely within a single sub-district, in which case I assign the value in that sub-district to
that town. In others, towns were split across registration sub-district boundaries. In those
cases I estimated town characteristics by weighting according to the proportion of the town
in each of the registration sub-districts.
Sample
For the purposes of this paper I analyze towns that existed as sanitary authorities throughout
the period 1875 to 1911. This allows us to assess the changes in spending and revenue
patterns over time without worrying about major changes in the composition of the sample.
By doing so, I exclude two sets of towns from our dataset. The first relates to those towns
11
that became sanitary authorities after 1875; particularly newer industrial towns in the North-
West. The second group relates to towns that stopped being sanitary authorities during this
period; this group consists of sanitary authorities that were merged together after a certain
point—in particular when large towns subsumed urban areas in its suburbs. In both cases
the towns excluded reflect a relatively small part of the urban population.5
The sample then consists of a total of 691 towns, whose characteristics are summarized
in Table 2.5 in the appendix. The towns vary significantly in size with the smallest town
having a population of only approximately 200 throughout the period, but the largest towns
(such as Manchester and Liverpool) having a population of several hundred thousand.
2.3 The development of the sanitary state
In this section I use the dataset to examine the growth and variation in the level of expen-
diture across towns and over time. I start by analyzing the effectiveness of the decentralized
system implemented by the public health acts of 1848 and 1875; showing that providing
powers to local governments was insufficient to induce towns to invest. As a prelude to the
formal empirical analysis in the next section, I then investigate possible explanations for
towns’ reluctance to invest. First I identify differences in revenue sources available to towns,
including variation in the size of the tax base available, revenue from property holdings, and
revenue from other trading activities. I then provide new evidence as to costs of borrowing,
and the government grants provided to towns available over time. Finally, I discuss the
importance of changing governance structures on different towns.
5The included towns represent 79% of the population of urban areas reported in the 1881 census, and
73% of the urban population reported in the 1891 census.
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2.3.1 Decentralization and expenditure on public goods
Parliament reacted to the growing sanitary movement in the 1840s by emphasizing the
role of local action in combating insanitary conditions. Rather than taking direct action
to improve sanitary environments, the national government “began a series of legislative
measures in which the state became guarantor of standards of health and environmental
quality and provided means for local units of government to make the structural changes
to meet those standards” (Hamlin and Sheard, 1998, p.587). As a result the nineteenth-
century saw a gradual broadening of both local governments’ powers and responsibility for
the maintenance of their local environment.
To examine the effectiveness of this decentralization movement, I examine the use of
new powers by towns first under the 1848 Public Health Act, which provided towns with
voluntary access to spending authority, and then under the 1872 and 1875 Public Health
Acts, which gave towns greater obligations to maintain sanitary environments. As I will see,
the Acts had some success in increasing expenditure on sanitary goods, but by no means
were sufficient to ensure quality sanitary environments: even by the end of the century many
areas were spending very small amounts on sanitary public goods.
The 1848 Public Health Act established the principal of “localism” in sanitary affairs,
offering local taxpayers (“ratepayers”) the opportunity to establish a local board of health
with responsibility for sewers and street cleaning, and the power to ensure a satisfactory water
supply.6 This provided towns with a low cost mechanism through which towns could gain the
authority to spend on sanitary improvements. Before 1848 such powers were obtainable only
on a case by case basis through private acts of Parliament (“Improvement Acts”), which
imposed an often prohibitive cost on smaller and poorer towns (Wilson, 1997). But the
1848 Act was not enough, since many towns did very little, even if they chose to obtain the
6The 1848 Public Health Act was extended by the 1858 Local Government Act, and many authorities
acquired their powers under the latter legislation. I refer to both as the 1848 Act for simplicity.
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power to do so. Faced with the lack of response from town councils, Parliament imposed
greater mandatory responsibilities on town councils. Public Health Acts of 1872 and 1875
established a network of urban and rural sanitary authorities covering the entire country,
tasked with the responsibility to ensure the provision of sanitary services in their jurisdiction.
Crucially the 1848 Act was voluntary in nature; as such some areas adopted it and others
did not. Table 2.1 displays the percentage of towns exercising different types of sanitary
authority by 1871. The table indicates that at least in in one sense the Act was successful:
almost three-quarters of towns held sanitary authority under either the 1848 Public Health
Act or its successor the 1858 Local Government Act. Further, even larger towns that had
not obtained authority under this Act had gained additional sanitary powers through other
legislative routes. In fact all towns with a population of over 25,000 had some control over
sanitary authority by 1871.
Table 2.1: Town population and local board adoption
Type of Sanitary Authority in 1865
Population Local
Board
Improv.
Comm.
Other
local act
None Total N
Under 10000 75% 3% 3% 19% 100% 515
10000-25000 71% 12% 4% 13% 100% 100
25000-50000 71% 7% 21% 0% 100% 42
50000-100000 57% 5% 38% 0% 100% 21
100000-250000 38% 0% 63% 0% 100% 8
Over 250000 20% 0% 80% 0% 100% 5
Total 73% 5% 6% 16% 100% 691
Note: Local Board relates to boards created under the 1848 Public Health Act or the 1858 Local Government
Act. “Improv. Comm.” relates to boards established as local improvement commissions. Other local act reports
sanitary authority under a different form for municipal boroughs only. Towns were identified using the 1871 cen-
sus and the 1903 Report from the Select Committee on Municipal Trading cited in footnote 16.
Table 2.1 suggests that a large number of towns had obtained at least the means to
control sanitary expenditure by 1871. However, their motivation was not always to increase
spending. In fact, many areas reportedly took up the act in order to avoid higher taxes for
highway maintenance (Lumley, 1873).7 In fact fewer than 35% of the 710 towns had received
7In particular the 1862 Highways Act gave Local Boards an opt out from becoming part of larger Highways
14
sanitary authority before this date.8
Further evidence of the limited success of the 1848 Public Health Act emerges from an
analysis of town spending. By 1872 nearly all towns were spending money on streets and
highways, but there was a much larger degree of variation in whether—and how much—towns
were spending on either water supply or sewer systems. Figure 2.1 presents the changing
proportion of towns spending at all in each of these categories between 1872 and 1904. As
discussed above, the figures between 1872 and 1884 should be treated with some caution,
since the disaggregation of activities by category is inconsistent prior to that date. Municipal
boroughs, in particular, did not always separate spending categories at the beginning of
the period, and so particularly for larger towns the proportions may be underestimates.
Nevertheless this information provides some indication of the changing activities of the towns
over time.
The figures for 1872—the last year of spending under the system established in 1848—
indicate that most larger (defined as 1871 population of more than 50,000) towns had begun
spending on sewer systems before the 1872 act. However only around 70% of mid-sized
towns (10,000-50,000 population) and fewer than 50% of smaller towns had done so. For
water supply, approximately 45% of large and mid-sized towns were spending on water supply
as opposed to approximately 35% of small towns. Given the inaccuracies in the data this may
underestimate the proportion of towns spending at this point, but it is clear that many towns
were not devoting any money to these categories. Further, similar figures are provided by
pre-1872 information indicating that in 1865 55% of towns had invested in drainage systems,
and only 21% in water supply under the 1848 Public Health Act.9 Interestingly, only 38%
reported capital investments in highways, suggesting that much of this expenditure was likely
Districts.
8Figures based on Return of Districts where Public Health Act, 1848, or Local Government Act, 1858,
or both, are in force,1867(80)LIX.141.
9Return of Districts under Public Health Act, 1848, and Local Government Act, 1858; Expenses for
Works of Sewerage, Water Supply and other Sanitary Works, 1866(176)LX.419.
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ongoing maintenance and cleaning rather than investments.
Were the 1870s Public Health Acts successful in increasing sanitary expenditure? Fig-
ure 2.1 suggests they were—to an extent. The number of towns involved in both sewer
systems and water supply increased rapidly both between 1872 and 1877, and even more so
between 1879 and 1885. These trends provide clear evidence of rapid changes following the
imposition of the Public Health Acts, even accounting for the fact that some of the initial
growth in the estimated proportion of towns involved in sewers and, particularly, water is
likely to be a reflection of changes in town reporting (especially amongst the larger towns
that tended to be municipal boroughs).
However it is also clear that the Public Health Acts had not achieved consistent expen-
diture across the country, for even in 1885 (ten years after the Act) one-quarter of towns
were still spending nothing on sewers, and almost half were spending nothing on water sup-
ply. The challenge of enticing towns to spend was not resolved immediately, but remained
a gradual process, with the proportion of towns spending continuing to increase until the
mid-1890s. Similarly, much of the increase in the level of sanitary expenditure did not im-
mediately follow the imposition of the Public Health Acts, but occurred after 1885 (see
Appendix Figure 2.7).
In addition, the aggregate growth in expenditure masks large and persistent variation
in the level of expenditure, as shown in Figure 2.2.10 Despite clear growth in the level of
expenditure nationally, great variation persisted throughout the nineteenth-century, with
many towns spending very little on sanitation expenditure even in the mid-1890s.
10To provide comparability over time, the figure displays the density of nominal expenditure per capita
in terms of the estimated national average (full employment) wage in each year. The average wage was
calculated using the 1911 nominal wage reported in Feinstein (1990), deflated using the money wage index
from Crafts and Mills (1994).
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Figure 2.1: Steady increases in the proportion of towns involved in both water
supply and sewer systems between 1872 and 1904.
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2.3.2 Financing public goods expenditure
How can we explain this variation across towns? To answer that question, we must under-
stand the financial constraints that towns faced in funding their spending. During this period
towns were responsible for funding their own expenditure, with limited financial support from
central government. Consequently towns’ ability to invest was “closely circumscribed by lo-
cal wealth and income” (Millward, 2004, p. 35). Further, capital investments had to be
funded out of debt; making the cost of borrowing a potential disincentive to greater spend-
ing. In this subsection I analyze these constraints, and the extent to which they may have
17
Figure 2.2: Towns varied widely in their level of sanitary expenditure
throughout the nineteenth-century.
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Note: The x-axis plots the total nominal spending on sanitation per capita (streets, sewers
and water supply) divided by the estimated national average money wage in each year. See
text for details of the sources. The figure excludes a small number of towns with sanitary
expenditure greater than £1 p.c. for illustrative purposes.
varied over towns and across time, as well as the extent of government support in the form
of grants. In the following section I then test the importance of these different factors in
explaining the level of public goods expenditure.
Constraints on revenue
The primary source of revenue available to towns was local taxation. Limitations on local
authority powers, in place throughout the period, meant that tax could only be raised on
“immovable” property, and as such towns were constrained by the “rateable value” of the
18
property in their district, defined according to the rental value of land and buildings in the
district.11 Millward and Sheard (1995) find that, using a small sample of urban areas, a 1%
increase in the per capita rateable value of the district was associated with a 1% increase in
the level of per capita expenditure (see also Aidt et al. (2010) and, in the German case, Brown
(1988)). Figure 2.3 illustrates the wide variation in the level of per capita rateable value
across towns: in 1875 the per capita rateable value of the median town was approximately
half that of the town at the 95th percentile. Notably, however, although there were great
increases in the rateable value per capita over time, it did not increase significantly when
compared to nominal wages: the increases in spending necessitated either higher tax rates
or alternative sources of revenue.
Towns did, however, have access to some other sources of revenue. Faced with significant
opposition to higher taxation, councils began to search for alternative means of funding
expenditure (Hennock, 1973, 1963; Wohl, 1983; Millward, 2000; Aidt et al., 2010). Millward
and Sheard (1995) and Millward (2000) highlight two particular sources. The first was income
from estates, which provided income in the form of rents and property sales. The second was
profits from municipal involvement in activities such as gas supply, markets or, from the end
of the nineteenth-century, tramways and electric light undertakings. The classic example of
the latter route is Birmingham, where Joseph Chamberlain advocated strongly for the use
of gas profits to subsidize urban improvements. Our analysis will assess the extent to which
this was a special case or a more widespread funding mechanism.
Government grants
Councils received some additional revenue from central government grants during this period.
However, the grants were limited to those services deemed “national” in character, such as
policing and maintenance of lunatics.12 Further, grants remained small compared to the size
11The details of the rating system are somewhat complex, since discounts could apply depending on both
the use of the land, and the way in which rent was paid. For further information see Offer (1981) and the
final report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation cited in footnote 12.
12For further discussion of the rationale and use of central government grants during this period see the
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Figure 2.3: Towns varied widely in the size of their tax base.
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Note: The x-axis plots the total nominal ratable value per capita divided by the estimated
national average money wage in each year. Rateable value data was collected from the Local
Taxation Returns; see text for the sources used to calculate the money wage. The figure
excludes towns with rateable value per capita more than £10 for illustrative purposes.
of town revenue, with many towns receiving nothing at all and few receiving an amount
exceeding 5% of their rate revenue. As a result, the economic literature has generally seen
grants as having a limited role.13
However, there were some important changes in the grant system after 1890 that may have
received too little focus in the existing literature.14 In 1890 new county councils, created by
the 1888 Local Government Act, gained responsibility for maintaining “main roads” within
their jurisdiction. As a result they had to bear some of the cost of maintenance and repair
Final Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 1901 [Cd. 638]XXIV.413.
13See Millward and Sheard (1995), for instance, who group central government grants along with all other
“non-trading” income.
14See however the discussion in Waller (1983).
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of roads within their district, necessitating transfers to town councils within their area. The
size of these transfers, while not huge, were much larger than other forms of external revenue.
Once transfers from the counties is included, the median town received grants worth more
20% of their rate revenue in 1895—of which by far the largest component related to funding
of roads. These grants amounted to 40% of the median town’s expenditure on roads.15
These transfers were funded largely by sources outside of each individual town, through
either a county-wide tax or funding from central government. As such, these grants allowed
spending on roads to be funded from a wider tax base than the town’s own property. How-
ever, often this funding was essentially conditional on towns also spending their own tax
revenue: they would often access this funding through cost-sharing agreements where, for
instance, the County Council would agree to fund a fixed amount of maintenance cost per
year for a fixed term. Alternatively, towns could seek to broaden the scope of the funding
they received by petitioning for more roads to be recognized as “main roads”.
Borrowing and access to loans
While these revenue sources formed the long-term basis for investment in public goods,
the high up-front capital costs of infrastructure investment had to be met through loans.
Local authority borrowing was considered the key benchmark of the progress in developing
sanitary infrastructure by contemporaries, and access to affordable capital was seen as major
obstacle to investment (Bellamy, 1988). In 1902 on average over 95% of capital invested in
trading authorities had been borrowed.16 By 1904, the total borrowing of all urban districts
amounted to 35% of the total national debt.17
15These figures exclude the “county boroughs”—consisting mainly of towns with population above 50,000,
who acted as independent counties and so did not receive these transfers.
16Author’s calculation based on figures in Report from the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords
and the House of Commons on Municipal Trading, 1903 (270)VII.1.
17Calculated as the sum of borrowing of borough councils and urban sanitary districts for all purposes in
1903–1904, divided by the nominal amount of unredeemed capital of the UK public debt. The sources of
the information are the 1903-04 Local Taxation Returns and Mitchell (1971, p. 600).
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Ensuring access to finance thus became a critical part of the central government’s at-
tempts to encourage local authorities to improve the sanitary environment.18 Urban im-
provement loans were available from Public Works Loan Commissioners from the 1860s
onward, ensuring that all towns did have access to loans throughout this period. However,
the appropriate terms of repayment (including the interest rate, the repayment method and
repayment term) remained an issue of debate into the twentieth-century, and were not always
overly favorable to towns seeking to invest.
As a result, councils tended to opt for borrowing from alternative sources where possible.
This may have led to barriers to investment for smaller towns, but “the big towns and
cities experienced little difficulty in raising finance for their ambitious projects...revealing a
comparative advantage in their access to loans which after 1870 they extensively exploited”
(Wilson, 1997, p.39).
Our data allows us to directly test the extent to which larger towns gained this com-
parative advantage. As shown in the left hand panel of Figure 2.4 there was wide variation
in the average interest rate being paid across towns. Further, there was a considerable de-
cline in the average level of the interest rate over time, as shown in the right hand panel of
the figure. For comparison purposes, I also include the yield on consols which serves as an
approximation to the long-term interest rate (Mitchell, 1971, pp.649–640).
To explore the characteristics of towns affecting the cost of borrowing, in the appendix
I undertake a simple regression analysis with the average interest rate as the dependent
variable. The results show consistent evidence that, as suggested by Wilson (1997), larger,
wealthier towns had a lower interest rate. Further, as expected, the yield on consols is
strongly significant and positive, indicating that towns’ cost of borrowing was reacting to
changes in the money markets. This is notable, as it suggests that towns were not purely
dependent on government loans in this period.
18The discussion in this paragraph is based on Wohl (1983); Bellamy (1988); Wilson (1997).
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Figure 2.4: Cost of town borrowing fell between 1887 and 1904.
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2.3.3 Governance of sanitary authorities
In addition to changing town funding, Westminster also intervened in local affairs through
alternations to the electoral system under which town councils were governed. While the
powers of the sanitary authorities were standardized across the country, the structure of
the governing bodies varied across the county, and over time. The sanitary authorities
in the incorporated towns—the so called “municipal boroughs”—were constituted by the
existing borough council. In non-incorporated towns, in contrast, the sanitary authorities
were governed by a newly elected local board or (after 1872) council. As a result the electoral
system varied across the two groups of towns. Following the 1835 Municipal Corporations
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Act, incorporated towns had been governed by a standardized system of locally elected
councils. These councils were elected annually (with one-third of councilors replaced each
year) on the basis of one-man-one-vote, by an electorate consisting of all male heads of
household subject to residence and tax-paying requirements.19
Non-municipal boroughs, on the other hand, were elected under a graduated franchise.
Under this system voters could receive up to twelve votes depending on the amount of
property occupied and owned. The secret ballot was instituted in municipal boroughs—
but not other towns—as part of the 1872 Ballot Act (which also implemented the ballot in
parliamentary elections.) This distinction in electoral practice was maintained until the 1894
Local Government Act, which standardized a system of one-man-one-vote, with the secret
ballot, across all towns.
We might expect that extensions of political power to the poor would be associated with
increases in expenditure if poorer citizens vote for higher government spending to achieve
redistribution (as in the classic Meltzer-Richard (1981) model). Alternatively, removing
the power of elites might lead to greater spending through preventing pork barrel spending
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2004). Lindert (2004) suggests that, in fact, this mechanism was im-
portant in increasing social spending after 1880. If investment in public goods were driven
by extensions of political power to the poor, we would expect that (all else being equal)
municipal boroughs would be more involved in sanitary activity until 1894 for two reasons.
First because prior to this date wealthier citizens received multiple votes in non-municipal
boroughs and, secondly, the lack of a secret ballot might allow landlords to intimidate their
tenants.
I test this proposition formally in Section 2.4. However, a simple examination of the
data suggests that the democratic governance structure in municipal boroughs was neither a
19It is these councils that are discussed extensively in Lizzeri and Persico (2004), with the authors arguing
that the imposition of wider franchise in these municipal boroughs resulted from growing demand for public
goods following industrialization.
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necessary or sufficient condition for investment in sanitation. Although the left hand panel of
Figure 2.5 shows that municipal boroughs as a whole were more likely to be spend on water
and sewers than non-municipal boroughs, this difference disappears if we take into account
the characteristics of municipal boroughs, which tended to be larger and less industrial on
average than other towns. As a crude comparison group, I limit the sample to the towns of
comparable size in 1851 in the right hand panel of the figure.20 With that simple control
for size and town occupation, the towns spending on water supply are approximately similar
across the two groups. Strikingly, the proportion of towns spending on sewers is actually
much higher in the non-incorporated group of towns for much of the period. I consider the
comparability of the two groups of towns further in the empirical analysis.
An alternative way to understand whether the democratic governance in municipal bor-
oughs was associated with greater investment in public goods and services is to investigate
the timing of investments by towns that became incorporated over this period. Fifty-four
towns became municipal boroughs between 1871 and 1904, providing the opportunity to
identify whether they began spending on various public goods before or after incorporation.
To do this, I combine the information from the Local Taxation Returns regarding annual
spending on water supply and sewer spending, combined with additional information from
the 1903 Report of the Select Committee on Municipal Trading which provides the date mu-
nicipal boroughs began trading in other public goods and services—including burial, baths,
gas and markets.21
The results, presented in Table 2.2, indicate that incorporation was neither necessary or
sufficient for investment in these public goods. In general these towns began spending on
each of these public goods before they became incorporated rather than afterward. Nearly all
20Towns were included in the 1851 were census if they were “principal towns”, including particularly
market towns. This excludes many of the newer industrial towns in Yorkshire and the North-West.
21The Select Committee Report also identifies when towns began trading activities in water supply (as
distinguished from any expenditure). The findings are similar indicating that 50% of towns had begun
trading before incorporation and only 8% afterward. See footnote 16 for the full reference of the report.
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Figure 2.5: Municipal boroughs were not more active in sanitary expenditure
once differences in population size are accounted for.
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(94%) of the towns spent money on sewers before they were incorporated, while 76% of towns
were engaged in water supply. Further, a higher proportion of towns were involved in all
but one of the activities in Table 2.2 before incorporation than afterward. The exception—
relating to burial activities, saw only a small difference, with 24% of towns starting activities
after incorporation as opposed to 22% beforehand.
2.3.4 Differences in demand and cost of provision
Aside from local politics and the requirements imposed by central government, there may
have been significant differences across towns in both the cost of provision and level of de-
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Table 2.2: Towns incorporated between 1872 and 1903 were more likely to
start providing public goods and services before incorporation than afterwards.
Activity Before
incorporation
After
incorporation
Not before 1904
Burial 22% 24% 54%
Bath 38% 24% 38%
Gas 30% 12% 58%
Markets 42% 12% 46%
Sewers 94% 4% 2%
Water 76% 11% 13%
Note: Based on 54 towns incorporated between 1872 and 1903, except for figures for burial and baths
which are based on 50 towns incorporated between 1872 and 1899. Information for water, gas, and sew-
ers is drawn from the Local Taxation Returns, based on the first year of spending. Information for burial
and baths is drawn from the 1903 Report of the Select Committee on Trading, cited in footnote 16.
mand for public goods. Large, densely populated cities are more likely to suffer from disease
since cramped living conditions lend themselves to easy spread of disease. Further, the de-
mand for sanitary infrastructure is driven, partly, by the understanding of their importance
to public health which may be dependent on the size of sanitary movement within a city.
Aside from sanitary concerns, there may be other sources of demand for some of the
public goods examined here. Water supply, for instance, was in demand for industrial as
well as consumer needs (Hassan, 1985). We might also think that sewer systems (particularly
drainage) might be in greater demand in more agricultural areas.
On the cost side of the analysis, we must consider the fact that there may be important
economies of scale in the provision of many of these sanitary investments. Larger cities
may have lower costs of provision per capita; since the fixed costs of (for instance) a water
plant would be spread over a wider area. Similarly, there may be cost savings associated
with densely populated areas, since there pipes and streets need to be laid for a smaller
difference. Higher numbers of people per house mean that several people can be reached for
the cost of a single connection to a water main.
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2.4 Empirical analysis
How then do these differences in costs, demand and political structure affect the growth and
variation in the size of expenditure on sanitary public goods after 1870? In this section I test
the importance of these different factors in determining the level of spending and also revenue
sources. I first examine the relationship between different funding sources and demographic
characteristics on the level of expenditure on public goods. I then use the imposition of
the 1894 Local Government Act to address the effects of democratic reform on expenditure
patterns.
2.4.1 Determinants of public goods expenditure
In this section I analyze the observable characteristics associated with local government
expenditure on each of the sanitation public goods. In particular, I estimate the following
specification using includes twenty-one cross sections covering the period 1884-1904:
yi,t = α + β1DEMOGRAPHICi,t + β2OCCUPATIONi + β3FINANCEi,t + δyear + i,t
where i indexes a town, t indexes a year, and yi,t represents either the level of spending
per capita or the outstanding loan stock per capita. I run separate regressions for the
aggregate sanitary public goods category, and the three component parts of sewers, water
supply and streets. DEMOGRAPHIC, OCCUPATION , and FINANCE are vectors of
control variables that we might expect to be associated with the demand for public goods
expenditure—I explain these further in the following paragraph. I include year fixed effects
to account for trend growth in the town over time and, in some specifications, town fixed
effects.
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The first set of variables, FINANCEi,t are used to test the importance of financial
constraints. These constraints include both the rateable value per capita in the town—in
other words, the tax base available to the district—and two non-tax sources of revenue:
receipts from property and receipts from “tolls and dues”.22 In addition, I test whether
trading profits from gas supply subsidized public goods expenditure by including a dummy
variable indicating whether the town was involved in gas supply. Finally, in specifications
(2), (4), (6) and (8) the estimated average interest rate is included to test the importance of
variation in financing costs.
To address different potential sources of demand for sanitary public goods, the second
set of control variables capture the occupational make-up of the town, using data from the
1881 census. In particular, I include dummy variables to identify whether the town contains
a large (defined as more than 10%) share of the total workforce in textiles, minerals (i.e.,
mining and related concerns), or agriculture. I also include the percentage of “white collar”
workers—defined as either commerce or the professions—as a measure of the strength of the
new professional middle class that are often associated with the sanitary reform movement.
Since these variables are measured in only one period they are excluded when town fixed
effects are included.
The final set of variables, DEMOGRAPHICi,t, includes population, population density,
population growth, and urban crowding (defined as the number of people per house). As
discussed above, these characteristics may affect both the demand for and cost of sanitation
infrastructure. For example, more crowded or denser cities could have higher need for sani-
tation expenditure to combat differences to maintain the quality of the urban environment.
On the other hand, they might be correlated with differences in costs due to economies of
scale. To capture these potentially competing effects I include these demographic variables
22Receipts from property includes both rents and receipts from property sales. Tolls and dues include, for
instance, market fees.
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in bins, rather than as linear variables.
The results of the pooled cross section regressions related to ongoing sanitary expenditure
are presented in Table 2.3. In the discussion I focus predominantly on these results since the
findings are very similar to those in other specifications—both those using the outstanding
loan stock as the dependent variable, and those including town fixed effects. As such,
the detailed results of those other specifications are relegated to the appendix.23 Both the
dependent variable and the independent variables are standardized in all specifications (with
the exception of the dummy variables and the average interest rate), and as such the results
can be read as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable in
terms of a standard deviation of the dependent variable.
The strongest and most consistent result is that the coefficient related to the rateable
value per capita is, as expected, positive and very statistically significant. This provides
strong evidence that wealthier towns spent more on each of the three categories of sanitary
public goods. The evidence regarding the importance of other sources of revenue is, however,
more mixed: increased revenue from market tolls and involvement in gas supply are both
associated with greater sanitary expenditure, but there is no evidence that greater revenue
from property led to towns spending more. Trading in gas was associated with greater
spending on water, which provides some corroboration for the claim that towns beyond
Birmingham used “trading profits” to fund other investment. Further analysis, contained
in the appendix, indicates that these trading profits were used to reduce taxes as well as
increase expenditure.
There is clear evidence of the effect of reduced borrowing costs on the level of expen-
diture: the coefficient on the average interest rate indicates that a 1% decrease in the cost
23The only major exception is that the many of the coefficients related to the demographic variables
become statistically insignificant once town fixed effects are included, which is likely to reflect that these
variables are not well identified in these specifications due to the limited extent of changes within towns over
time in these variables.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of adjusted expenditure per capita: pooled cross
section regressions.
Standardized dependent variables
Sanitary spend p.c. Water spend p.c. Sewers spend p.c. Streets spend p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rateable value p.c. 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.38*** 0.36***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Property receipts p.c. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Tolls receipts p.c. 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.04 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Transfers p.c.: county roads 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.03 0.03 0.03** 0.04** 0.47*** 0.44***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Transfers p.c.: other 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.04*** 0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Involved in Gas 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Average interest rate -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Municipal Borough -0.07 -0.03 0.17** 0.20*** -0.14* -0.15* -0.13*** -0.09**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Occupational characteristics
>10% Textiles 0.13** 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.14** 0.15** 0.06 0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
>10% Agriculture 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.17*** 0.17** -0.05 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
>10% Minerals -0.12*** -0.11** 0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.16*** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
% White Collar 0.07*** 0.08** -0.01 -0.03 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.05** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
% Foreign Born -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.07 -0.08* -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.09***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Population
Popn 10k-25k 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Popn 25k-50k 0.18** 0.15* 0.15 0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.15*** 0.15**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)
Popn 50k-100k 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.30* 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.28*** 0.26***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09)
Popn 100k-250k 0.26** 0.22* 0.23 0.20 -0.10 -0.15 0.27*** 0.25***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.08) (0.08)
Popn over 250k 0.51*** 0.49** 0.72** 0.76** -0.04 -0.08 0.29 0.27
(0.18) (0.22) (0.32) (0.33) (0.19) (0.20) (0.29) (0.32)
Population growth
Quartile 2 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.08* 0.08 -0.07* -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Quartile 3 0.08* 0.09** 0.12** 0.11* 0.15*** 0.14** -0.03 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Quartile 4 0.09* 0.11** 0.05 0.02 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.01 0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Urban crowding
Quartile 2 0.09** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11* 0.13*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Quartile 3 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.06 0.08 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.07 0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Quartile 4 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Population density
Quartile 2 -0.01 0.01 0.22*** 0.17** 0.34*** 0.32*** -0.30*** -0.23***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Quartile 3 -0.09 -0.07 0.14** 0.07 0.40*** 0.37*** -0.39*** -0.31***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Quartile 4 -0.07 -0.05 0.15 0.07 0.45*** 0.47*** -0.39*** -0.33***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07)
Town FE N N N N N N N N
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. obs 14429 10944 14429 10944 14433 10946 14435 10948
R-squared 0.54 0.52 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.23 0.62 0.60
Standard errors are clustered by town, and displayed in parentheses. All variables are standardized except for dummy variables and
the average interest rate. “Transfers p.c. county roads” is the estimated revenue received from county councils for maintenance of main
roads; “transfers p.c. other” captures all other transfers from both county councils and central government.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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of borrowing was associated with an increase in sanitary expenditure of approximately 0.06
standard deviations. This result is strong in both the pooled cross section and also the fixed
effects regressions. The size of this effect might initially seem small, but we should consider
that this is likely an underestimate of the actual effect since our measure of the interest rate
necessarily excludes all towns that did not borrow in any period. Further, there may well
be an element of reverse causality, in that towns with easy access to credit may have been
willing to borrow more, leading to higher (average) interest rates on the loans they did have
outstanding.
We can also see that there is strong evidence that the direct subsidies to town councils
to improve main roads were effective in increasing the level of expenditure. The coefficient
relating to the variable “transfers p.c. county roads” has a large and strongly statistically
significant effect on spending on streets and, as a result, sanitary expenditure as a whole.
Further, it appears that the grants for roads may have targeted towards areas which had
underinvested (relatively) in the past, since there is a strong negative correlation between
increased county grants for roads spending and the stock of loans outstanding for streets
(see Table 2.9 in the appendix).
The results relating to the occupational characteristics of the towns also shed some light
on the groups driving demand for public goods. The findings show some evidence that
textiles towns (defined as having a greater than 10% of the workforce employed in textiles)
had higher levels of loans outstanding in both water supply and sewer systems.24 Notably,
however, there is consistent evidence that “minerals towns” (defined as having a greater than
10% of the workforce employed in minerals), such as mining areas, had lower expenditure
on sanitary public goods, particularly streets. Interestingly also, a greater share of “white
collar” workers is associated with higher levels of expenditure on sewer systems and streets,
but not water supply (in fact there appears to be a negative relationship with the stock of
24See Table 2.8 in the appendix for the full results of these specifications.
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outstanding water supply loans). To the extent that this variable captures the existence
of a sanitary movement, it provides further evidence that the push for clean water was for
industrial rather than sanitary purposes. Similarly, as hypothesized in the previous section,
agricultural towns are found to have had a higher level of expenditure on sewers, which may
capture farmers’ needs for drainage.
The final set of results relate to the correlations between the level of expenditure and
demographic characteristics. The results indicate that spending was generally high in larger
cities, but that this effect is driven largely by expenditure on streets. Expenditure on water
supply was highest in the very largest cities, but there is no evidence of any difference in the
level of expenditure at lower levels of population.
There is, however, evidence of economies of scale when looking at the results regarding
urban crowding and population density. Expenditure on sanitary expenditure is highest in
the middle two quartiles of urban crowding, consistent with there being a reduction in costs
due to the need for fewer house connections. Similarly, denser towns spent less per capita
on streets, reflecting the need for fewer roads in a smaller area.
2.4.2 Democratic institutions and sanitary expenditure
The previous section has highlighted some key characteristics of the towns that chose to
spend on public goods. In this section I build on those results by exploring whether demo-
cratic institutions were key to achieving local government investment in sanitary public
goods. As discussed previously, the governance structure of the towns controlling sanitary
authority varied significantly across the country and across time. The incorporated towns,
or “municipal boroughs” were governed under a system of one-man-one-vote throughout the
period. The non-incorporated towns, in contrast, were governed by a council elected under
a graduated franchise, whereby citizens could receive up to twelve votes dependent on the
value of property they owned or occupied.
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In 1894 this latter system was changed, with all towns placed under councils elected on the
one-man-one-vote principle. In this section, I use this change to test the effects of democratic
reform on town expenditure. As national legislation this can be thought of as exogenous to
any individual town, particularly since the Act was motivated predominantly by the effect on
Poor Law Unions rather than sanitary authorities. I use a difference-in-difference approach
to test the effects of this institutional change on spending in the non-municipal boroughs.
The treatment group in this case are the non-municipal boroughs (“Non-MBs”); while the
control group are the incorporated towns, or municipal boroughs (“MBs”). In essence then
I compare the non-municipal boroughs to a group of “already treated” towns. Our approach
then involves testing whether the difference in spending on different types of public service
changed after the 1894 reforms. In particular, I estimate the following specifications for the
period 1884-1904:
yi,t = α + β1POST 1894 + β2NONMB ∗ POST 1894 + β3Xi,t + γ1Ti + γ2year
where i indexes towns and t indexes years. NONMB is a dummy variable equaling 1
if the town is not incorporated in 1894, POST 1894 is a dummy variable equaling one for
the period after 1894, X is a vector of control variables, year is a vector of year fixed effects
and T is a vector of town fixed effects.25 The effect of the Local Government Act is then
measured by the sign of the coefficient β2. If democratic reform led to greater sanitation
expenditure , then β2 > 0.
For this approach to be appropriate it must be the case that in the absence of the 1894
Act, the change in the level of spending amongst the non-MBs would have been the same
as that amongst the municipal boroughs (the “parallel trends” assumption). While there
may be differences in time-invariant characteristics between the two groups, there should
25Note that the vector of town fixed effects absorbs the effect of being within a treatment or the control
group.
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not be differences that change over time or mean that towns react differently to other time-
changing factors (such as the state of the economy). This is a concern in our case for two
reasons. First, it is clear that there are large differences in the observable characteristics
of the group of municipal boroughs and the non-incorporated towns, as shown in the top
panel of Table 2.6 in the appendix. Municipal boroughs tended to be larger on average, and
included all the very large towns. They also tended to be wealthier and denser. Both of these
differences are concerning, since they may be correlated with other unobserved factors—such
as access to credit—that imply different trends in spending growth.
The second concern in comparing the two groups of towns is that the group of municipal
boroughs includes a number of towns that opted for incorporation in the period near to the
1894 LGA. This is concerning since incorporation often reflected a desire for town growth, or
demand for town prestige that we might expect to be associated with more rapid increases
in spending.
To address these concerns, I undertake a two-step matching process to generate a sample
with more balanced covariates. The first step trims the sample by removing towns that
chose to incorporate during the period, and by restricting the towns to a sub-group that
overlaps in size and occupational characteristics. By limiting the control group to those towns
incorporated as early as 1835, I address concerns regarding the selection effect, since these
towns were incorporated as a result of charters granted in previous centuries (often granted
in the Elizabethan era, for instance) and so there is no reason that their democratic status
should be related to their spending on the public goods of concern in the nineteenth-century.
Removing towns with very different characteristics—the very large municipal boroughs, and
non-municipal boroughs that had a very large share of their workforce in either agriculture,
textiles or minerals compared to the municipal boroughs—addresses some of the concern
that the towns are fundamentally different in their demand for sanitation.26
26Specifically, I remove all towns larger than the largest non-MB in 1881, and also all non-MBs with a
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The results of this exercise are displayed in the central panel of Table 2.6. Trimming the
sample reduces the differences between the groups of municipal boroughs and non-municipal
boroughs, but does not remove them. I therefore match municipal boroughs with similar
non-municipal boroughs. To do so, I use nearest-neighbor propensity score matching using
the 1883 (i.e., pre-analysis) covariates, including population, urban crowding, population
growth, population density, per capita rateable value and the percentage of the workforce
in textiles, minerals, white collar and agriculture. Under this process, a propensity score
is estimated for each of the towns, and each of the municipal boroughs is matched to the
closest non-municipal borough based on the propensity score. To ensure no single town
overly affects the results I do not allow for replacement: each town is only matched once.
This exercise leaves us with a sample of 256 towns in total (128 in each group). The bot-
tom panel displays the characteristics of the municipal boroughs and non-municipal boroughs
within this group. The characteristics of the group are much closer than in the unmatched
sample; however there remain significant differences. In particular, the non-municipal bor-
oughs remain both larger and more agricultural on average than the municipal boroughs.
Given this it is important to check that any results are robust to the inclusion of control
variables capturing changes in town characteristics over time.
To provide reassurance that the parallel trends assumption holds, I graph the path of
changes in the level of spending on water, sewers and streets in Figure 2.6. The trends are
generally very similar until 1894, but after this date there is some divergence in terms of
both per capita expenditure on water supply, and also streets expenditure. In the former
case, the figure shows that actually non-incorporated towns spent less on water supply after
democratic reform; while the latter shows an increase in their expenditure on streets per
capita.27
higher share of their workforce in either agriculture, minerals or textiles than any municipal borough.
27Note that the decline in expenditure displayed in the figure is a reflection of the fact that the graph is
in real terms and there was significant inflation between 1896 and 1900.
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Figure 2.6: Similar pre-trends between incorporated and non-incorporated
towns in matched sample.
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Table 2.4 presents the results of the regression analysis. The left hand column presents the
estimated coefficients of the interaction term when no control variables are included, while
the right hand column is the results when the control variables are included. As suggested by
Figure 2.6, there is evidence that the 1894 democratic reform led to statistically significant
decreases in both the level of expenditure per capita on water supply and the level of per
capita taxation. Further, these effects were relatively large, consisting of approximately
0.22 and 0.14 standard deviations respectively. Rather than drive sanitary expenditure, this
suggests that democratic change may, in fact, have inhibited spending on water supply.
The only evidence that suggests democratic reform may have increased expenditure comes
from per capita expenditure on streets. However the statistical significance is both weak
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and dependent on the inclusion of control variables—particularly the measure of transfers
for streets. But that effect can be interpreted as democratic reform leading to greater
expenditure given the level of county roads transfers. This finding is concerning, since the
level of transfers was partly determined by requests from town councils. As such this finding
could reflect either an unwillingness to seek support from county councils, or difficulties in
convincing them to invest in roads. As such, we should treat this result with caution.
What might explain the surprising finding that increasing the political power of the poor
was associated with lower spending on water supply and lower taxes? One possibility is that
when town councils were governed by elites they over-invested in water supply for industrial
purposes; after the switch to democratic government, the town populace did not wish to
invest any more in water. Alternatively, it may be that the poor were opposed to higher
taxes because of their low income. I will explore this explanation further in the following
chapter.
Table 2.4: Both water supply and tax receipts fell relatively to the control
group after the 1894 Local Government Act
Standardized
Dependent variable No controls Controls
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.02 -0.05
(0.07) (0.06)
Water spend p.c. -0.19*** -0.22***
(0.07) (0.07)
Sewers spend p.c. -0.04 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
Streets spend p.c. 0.11 0.10**
(0.08) (0.05)
Tax receipts p.c. -0.11** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05)
Coefficients relate to the NONMB x Post1894 interaction term. Control variables include pop-
ulation (in six bins), urban crowding, population growth, per capita rateable value, per capita
property receipts, per capita tolls revenues, per capita county road receipts and other per capita
transfers. Clustered standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper has provided new evidence as to the success—or otherwise—of the decentralized
provision of sanitary public goods in nineteenth-century England. The findings have shown
that merely passing responsibility to town councils was insufficient to overcome opposition to
expenditure. Our findings highlight the failings of the Westminster Parliament in encourag-
ing greater expenditure: by constraining towns to rely on their own taxes they limited towns’
ability to invest. Further, I present new evidence as to the importance of capital markets to
supporting investment; the provision of higher subsidies could have induced greater levels of
expenditure.
Second, the results of the paper indicate that democratic reform was not critical to
investment in urban infrastructure. Many towns were able to successfully invest with town
councils elected under a graduated franchise, and in the absence of the secret ballot. Further,
there is little evidence that the removal of these restrictions led to greater expenditure. In
fact there is evidence of a reduction in spending on water supply and tax revenue after these
democratic reforms. This suggests that the poorer citizens granted political power by these
institutional changes may have opposed greater expenditure and, in particular, taxation.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Descriptive statistics of the full sample
Table 2.5: Characteristics of towns in sample
N Min Mean Median Max SD
Population
1851 Population 327 1,707 15,593 5,775 375,955 34,833
1861 Population 507 311 13,470 4,648 443,938 34,261
1871 Population 691 197 13,035 4,888 493,405 34,089
1881 Population 691 187 15,892 5,804 552,508 39,709
1891 Population 691 199 18,622 6,298 517,980 46,407
1901 Population 691 219 21,949 7,283 684,958 55,323
Occupation (% 1881 labor force)
% Agriculture 691 0% 12% 9% 58% 11%
% Textiles 691 0% 12% 2% 64% 19%
% Minerals 691 2% 13% 6% 69% 15%
% White Collar 691 1% 5% 5% 24% 3%
% Domestic Service 691 4% 17% 17% 43% 8%
Note: Sample includes towns acting as urban sanitary authorities throughout the period 1875–1904. Number
of observations is reduced in 1851 and 1861 because not all towns were reported in the census in these years.
Percentage of workforce is estimated based on the “occupational order” of individuals reported in the 1881
census. The “white collar” category includes both the orders of “commerce” and “professionals”. See the
text for further estimation.
2.A.2 Additional empirical results
Tables 2.7–2.9 present the results of the additional specifications discussed in section 2.4.1.
Table 2.7 includes the results of the specifications using the spending per capita as the
dependent variable and including town fixed effects. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 report the results
with the outstanding loan stock per capita as the dependent variable, presenting the pooled
cross section and fixed effects specifications, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Propensity score matching: sub-samples are more similar after
matching exercise, but still significant differences in average population and
agriculture.
Non-MBs MBs Diff. SE p-val
N Mean N Mean
All observations
Population 468 6482 223 36932 -30450 3084 0.000
Urban crowding 468 5.06 223 5.17 -0.10 0.06 0.098
Population growth 468 1.0 223 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.089
Population density 468 5 223 14 -9 1 0.000
% Agriculture 468 14 223 10 3 1 0.000
% Textiles 468 13 223 9 4 2 0.005
% Minerals 468 15 223 9 7 1 0.000
% White Collar 468 5.1 223 6.1 -1.1 0.2 0.000
Rateable value p.c. 468 3.6 223 3.7 -0.1 0.1 0.321
Trimmed based on size and occupation
Population 317 5033 128 10146 -5113 539 0.000
Urban crowding 317 5.05 128 4.97 0.07 0.07 0.314
Population growth 317 1.0 128 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
Population density 317 5 128 9 -5 1 0.000
% Agriculture 317 15 128 15 0 1 0.704
% Textiles 317 10 128 5 6 1 0.000
% Minerals 317 13 128 7 6 1 0.000
% White Collar 317 5.4 128 6.0 -0.6 0.2 0.018
Rateable value p.c. 317 3.6 128 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.888
Matched observations
Population 128 6066 128 10146 -4080 796 0.000
Urban crowding 128 4.90 128 4.97 -0.07 0.08 0.368
Population growth 128 1.0 128 1.0 -0.0 0.00 0.769
Population density 128 6 128 9 -3 1.8 0.097
% Agriculture 128 19 128 15 4 1.3 0.001
% Textiles 128 4 128 5 -0 1.1 0.784
% Minerals 128 7 128 7 -0 0.9 0.773
% White Collar 128 5.7 128 6.0 -0.29 0.20 0.160
Rateable value p.c. 128 3.4 128 3.6 -0.13 0.15 0.363
“Trimmed sample” reflects the restriction to towns incorporated in 1835 or never incorpo-
rated, and in common support of population, and of percentage labor force in each of agri-
culture, minerals, and textiles in 1881. “Matched observations” refers to the sample created
based on propensity score matching. Population, urban crowding, population growth and per
capita rateable value refer to estimated values in 1883.
Determinants of tax burden
The results from the spending regressions indicate the importance of different types of rev-
enue stream—such as trading profits, or government grants—in stimulating expenditure. In
this appendix I look more closely at whether alternative revenues were, in fact, associated
with lower levels of tax revenue. If towns were using these sources of income as a replacement
for tax expenditure we would expect that these non-tax revenues would be associated with
lower tax rates for a given level of expenditure on sanitary public goods. However if they
purely led to higher expenditure, then we would expect that the relationship on taxation
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Figure 2.7: Steady increases in sanitary expenditure and tax revenue between
1872 and 1904.
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would be negative, conditional on the level of town expenditure or infrastructure stock.
To test these relationships, I run specifications similar to those in Section 2.4 but using per
capita tax revenue as the dependent variable. To control for the fact that higher expenditure
would entail higher tax receipts, I also include the per capita loan maintenance expenses
(including both principal and interest payments). I use this measure as it will be largely
determined by past expenditure, and so will not lead to spurious correlation whereby a town
raises receipts and expenditure simultaneously.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.10. Columns (1) and (2) display the
results of the pooled analysis, while (3) and (4) contain the fixed effects specifications. In
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Table 2.7: Determinants of adjusted expenditure per capita: fixed effect
regressions.
Standardized dependent variables
Sanitary spend p.c. Water spend p.c. Sewers spend p.c. Streets spend p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rateable value p.c. 0.36*** 0.44*** 0.16** 0.15 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.35***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Property receipts p.c. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Tolls receipts p.c. -0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Transfers p.c.: county roads 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.36*** 0.28***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Transfers p.c.: other 0.02* 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Involved in Gas 0.11 0.14* 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)
Average interest rate -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Municipal Borough -0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.14*** -0.14**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.20) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
Population
Popn 10k-25k 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.15* 0.05 -0.04 -0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Popn 25k-50k 0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.22* 0.11 0.03 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08)
Popn 50k-100k 0.21 0.14 0.28 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.06
(0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09)
Popn 100k-250k 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.03 0.25 0.26 0.11 0.13
(0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15)
Popn over 250k 0.25 0.17 0.00 -0.22 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.26
(0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.29) (0.16) (0.16)
Population growth
Quartile 2 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Quartile 3 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Quartile 4 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Urban crowding
Quartile 2 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Quartile 3 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.13* -0.08 0.12*** 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
Quartile 4 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.19* -0.32*** -0.24** 0.10 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Population density
Quartile 2 -0.01 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.19 -0.13 -0.03
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.09) (0.12)
Quartile 3 -0.10 -0.02 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.12 -0.26** -0.18
(0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.18)
Quartile 4 -0.22** -0.15 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.08 -0.29** -0.21
(0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.23) (0.13) (0.17)
Town FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. obs 14429 10944 14429 10944 14433 10946 14435 10948
No. towns 691 660 691 660 691 660 691 660
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses. All variables are standardized except for dummy variables and
the average interest rate. “Transfers p.c. county roads” is the estimated revenue received from county councils for maintenance of
main roads; “transfers p.c. other” captures all other transfers from both county councils and central government. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(2) and (4) I add the variable measuring the loan maintenance costs per capita.
As expected, the results in columns (1) and (3) are similar to the previous regressions.
In particular, the coefficients on rateable value, tolls receipts and involvement in gas supply
are associated with greater taxation. However this picture changes once the measure of
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Table 2.8: Determinants of outstanding loan stock per capita: pooled
cross-section regressions.
Standardized dependent variables
Sanitary loans p.c. Water loans p.c. Sewers loans p.c. Streets loans p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rateable value p.c. 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.13*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05)
Property receipts p.c. -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Tolls receipts p.c. 0.07*** 0.06** 0.04 0.03 0.05* 0.02 0.13*** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Transfers p.c.: county roads -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Transfers p.c.: other 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Involved in Gas 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Average interest rate -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Municipal Borough 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Occupational characteristics
>10% Textiles 0.26*** 0.25** 0.22** 0.22* 0.15** 0.14* 0.11 0.10
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
>10% Agriculture 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.16** -0.05 -0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
>10% Minerals -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.16*** -0.18***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
% White Collar -0.00 -0.03 -0.07** -0.08*** 0.12*** 0.08 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
% Foreign Born 0.05 0.06 0.07** 0.08** -0.07** -0.06 0.07** 0.08**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Population
Popn 10k-25k 0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Popn 25k-50k 0.31** 0.23 0.26 0.21 -0.03 -0.13 0.50*** 0.45***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Popn 50k-100k 0.53** 0.48** 0.51** 0.48** 0.05 0.00 0.46*** 0.40**
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20)
Popn 100k-250k 0.63*** 0.57** 0.38 0.35 -0.03 -0.08 1.49*** 1.43***
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.18) (0.20) (0.36) (0.36)
Popn over 250k 1.39*** 1.36*** 1.34*** 1.36*** -0.42** -0.48** 2.14*** 2.01***
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.18) (0.19) (0.49) (0.48)
Population growth
Quartile 2 0.12** 0.10* 0.07 0.05 0.13** 0.11* 0.09** 0.09*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Quartile 3 0.16*** 0.12** 0.07 0.04 0.20*** 0.15** 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Quartile 4 0.11* 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.12* 0.12*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Urban crowding
Quartile 2 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Quartile 3 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.09
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Quartile 4 -0.16* -0.19** -0.11 -0.11 -0.15* -0.21** -0.09 -0.11
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Population density
Quartile 2 0.21*** 0.14** 0.08 0.04 0.33*** 0.24** 0.09* 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
Quartile 3 0.19*** 0.12* 0.09 0.06 0.25*** 0.17* 0.10* 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Quartile 4 0.27*** 0.19* 0.15 0.09 0.28*** 0.20* 0.21** 0.20**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
Town FE N N N N N N N N
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. obs 14437 10949 14437 10949 14437 10949 14437 10949
R-squared 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.20 0.21 0.36 0.35
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses. All variables are standardized except for dummy variables and the
average interest rate. “Transfers p.c. county roads” is the estimated revenue received from county councils for maintenance of main
roads; “Transfers p.c. other” captures all other transfers from both county councils and central government. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: Determinants of outstanding loan stock per capita: fixed effects
regressions.
Standardized dependent variables
Sanitary loans p.c. Water loans p.c. Sewers loans p.c. Streets loans p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rateable value p.c. 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.10** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.02 -0.00
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)
Property receipts p.c. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Tolls receipts p.c. -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transfers p.c.: county roads 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Transfers p.c.: other 0.02** 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Involved in Gas 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.07
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06)
Average interest rate -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Municipal Borough 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.05 -0.05
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09)
Population
Popn 10k-25k 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.19* 0.14 -0.04 -0.06
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)
Popn 25k-50k -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.12
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Popn 50k-100k 0.15 0.10 0.26 0.25 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.25
(0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21)
Popn 100k-250k 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.11 -0.06 -0.10 0.41 0.04
(0.29) (0.28) (0.31) (0.29) (0.21) (0.21) (0.35) (0.31)
Popn over 250k -0.01 -0.26 -0.04 -0.17 -0.07 -0.11 0.22 -0.36
(0.35) (0.37) (0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.23) (0.63) (0.66)
Population growth
Quartile 2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Quartile 3 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.11** -0.09* -0.09** -0.08**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Quartile 4 -0.07* -0.08** -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11*** -0.10***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Urban crowding
Quartile 2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Quartile 3 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)
Quartile 4 0.12* 0.18** 0.13** 0.15** 0.08 0.18 -0.04 -0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08)
Population density
Quartile 2 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.05) (0.07)
Quartile 3 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
(0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.22) (0.06) (0.09)
Quartile 4 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.12
(0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.17) (0.25) (0.11) (0.15)
Town FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. obs 14437 10949 14437 10949 14437 10949 14437 10949
No. towns 691 660 691 660 691 660 691 660
Standard errors are clustered by town and displayed in parentheses. All variables are standardized except for dummy variables and
the average interest rate. “Transfers p.c. county roads” is the estimated revenue received from county councils for maintenance of
main roads; “transfers p.c. other” captures all other transfers from both county councils and central government. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
loan maintenance is included. The coefficients on toll receipts and gas involvement become
negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on county road transfers is also
significantly negative in specifications (3) and (4). This suggests that these towns were using
these revenue sources partly to reduce their tax burden.
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Determinants of interest rate
To explore the characteristics of towns affecting the cost of borrowing, I undertake a simple
regression analysis with the average interest rate as the dependent variable. The results are
displayed in Table 2.11. In specification (1) and (2) I pool the data across years, whereas
in specifications (3) and (4) I include town fixed effects. The first approach allows us to
control for the effects of time-invariant characteristics of towns that may have affected the
cost of borrowing. This includes town occupational structure (for which I only have data for
1881), but also town size which would (generally) not change significantly over a twenty year
period. The fixed effects specification, on the other hand, allows us to control flexibly for
time-invariant characteristics that I cannot measure and focus on the within town changes
over time.
As control variables I include the town population, and town tax base, property income
per capita and revenue from tolls and dues. I also include the principal payments per capita
as a control variable in all specifications. This controls for the fact that interest rates may
be higher in towns with higher stocks of loans outstanding, and since the actual outstanding
loan stock was used in the calculation of the interest rate and so will be spuriously correlated.
I also include a dummy variable indicating whether the town was a municipal borough to
control for differences due to different governance structures or potentially prestige (Bellamy,
1988). Specifications (1) and (3) include the consol rate as a control variable, while specifi-
cations (2) and (4) include year fixed effects. The latter allows us to control for time specific
effects on the cost of borrowing not related to the consol rate. I include the consol rate as a
lagged value to account for the fact that it would take time to borrow following a fall in the
consol rate.
The results indicate that, as suggested by Wilson (1997), larger, wealthier towns had a
lower interest rate. The coefficient on town population is consistently negative, with the
exception of specification 4 (including both town and year fixed effects). This insignificance
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may reflect the limited change in population within a town over this period, or that town
size is capturing other characteristics (e.g., prestige) which are slow moving. The coefficient
on rateable value per capita is also statistically significant in all four specifications, which is
likely to reflect the fact that loans were generally secured on the potential income from rates.
There is also evidence that income from tolls and dues—an alternative to tax revenue—was
associated with lower town interest rates once time trends are accounted for. There is also
strong evidence that textiles towns also had a lower cost of borrowing, although the reason for
this is not clear. Finally, as expected, the yield on consols is strongly significant and positive,
indicating that towns’ cost of borrowing was reacting to changes in the money markets. This
is important, as it suggests that towns were not purely dependent on government loans in
this period.
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Table 2.10: Determinants of tax receipts per capita.
DV=Tax receipts per capita (standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rateable value p.c. 0.46*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.29***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Property receipts p.c. -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Tolls receipts p.c. 0.05*** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Transfers p.c.: county roads -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Transfers p.c.: other 0.02** -0.03** 0.02** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Involved in Gas 0.01 -0.39*** 0.12** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Loan maintenance p.c. 0.45*** 0.38***
(0.03) (0.03)
Occupations
>10% Textiles 0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
>10% Agriculture -0.05 -0.04
(0.04) (0.03)
>10% Minerals -0.18*** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.03)
% White Collar 0.13*** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.02)
% Foreign Born -0.07*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.01)
Population
Popn 10k-25k 0.11*** 0.09** 0.02 -0.06
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Popn 25k-50k 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.20* 0.10
(0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08)
Popn 50k-100k 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.59*** 0.50***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13)
Popn 100k-250k 0.66*** 0.47*** 0.96*** 0.89***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15)
Popn over 250k 1.17*** 0.71*** 1.65*** 1.71***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.28) (0.28)
Population growth
Quartile 2 0.10*** 0.04* -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Quartile 3 0.09** 0.01 -0.10*** -0.09***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Quartile 4 0.13*** 0.05 -0.16*** -0.13***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Urban crowding
Quartile 2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Quartile 3 0.08* 0.10*** 0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Quartile 4 0.05 0.09** 0.00 -0.03
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Population density
Quartile 2 0.21*** 0.09** 0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Quartile 3 0.21*** 0.08** 0.00 -0.07
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Quartile 4 0.27*** 0.13*** 0.03 -0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Municipal Borough 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.20***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
Town FE N N Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
No. obs 14437 14437 14437 14437
No. towns 691 691
Standard errors are clustered by town, and displayed in parentheses. All variables
are standardized except for dummy variables. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Interest rates lower in larger and wealthier towns.
DV=Average interest rate
Pooled Pooled Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population -0.05*** -0.03** -0.43*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06)
Principal payments p.c. 0.01 0.03 0.05** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Rateable value p.c. -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.24*** -0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Property receipts p.c. 0.01 0.01 -0.01*** -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Tolls receipts p.c. -0.00 -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Municipal Borough -0.06 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
>10% Textiles -0.21*** -0.22***
(0.04) (0.04)
Yield on Consols 0.43*** 0.34***
(0.04) (0.03)
No. obs 10499 10499 10499 10499
No. towns 660 660 660 660
Town Fixed Effects N N Y Y
Year Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Occupation controls Y Y N N
R-squared 0.05 0.13 - -
Standard errors are clustered by town, and displayed in parentheses. All variables are standardized except for
dummy variables and the yield on consols. “Occupational controls” include the percentage of population foreign
born, and dummy variables indicating whether more than 10% of the town workforce was working in agriculture
or minerals. “Municipal Borough” is a dummy variable indicating whether the town was a municipal borough in
1886—the year prior to the analysis period. Regression uses data for the years for which interest payment data
is available (1887–1903). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
How did the extension of the franchise
affect expenditure on local public goods?
3.1 Introduction
Most theories of democratization predict that extensions of the right to vote to the poor
will be associated with increases in government expenditure (e.g., Meltzer and Richard,
1981; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). Poorer citizens demand
greater levels of redistribution, hence government spending increases once they are granted
the franchise. However the same argument may not apply to expenditure on public goods: if
public goods are normal goods then the poor may prefer lower taxes and lower government
expenditure than the middle class (Epple and Romano, 1996; Bursztyn, 2013).
This distinction is particularly important for local governments, whose powers are of-
ten limited to public good expenditure rather than redistributive spending (Shah and Shah,
2009). In recent years development agencies have had increasing interest in passing respon-
sibility for key infrastructure projects—such as clean water supply—to local governments
on the basis that encouraging local participation will encourage more efficient levels of in-
vestment (Bonfiglioli, 2003). If the poor must pay for public goods, through higher taxes or
foregone transfers, devolution of power may lead to unanticipated opposition to government
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expenditure.
I propose a model of the relationship between the franchise and the size of government
where government expenditure is restricted to investment in public goods. The model pre-
dicts that, if the marginal utility of consumption is high at low levels of income, the poor
will oppose increased spending on public goods. The rich will also oppose increased spending
since they bear a relatively high share of the tax burden. Demand for public goods is thus
driven by the middle class: the relationship between the franchise and government expendi-
ture is inverted-U-shaped. As a result, an extension of the franchise to the poor may lead
to a reduction in public goods provision.
To test this prediction I construct a new dataset of local government expenditure and the
extent of the local franchise in England and Wales between 1867 and 1910. This approach
offers three advantages over the cross-country analyses undertaken in many previous studies
of franchise extension (e.g., Husted and Kenny, 1997; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Aidt et al.,
2006; Aidt and Dallal, 2008; Abrams and Settle, 1999; Lindert, 2004). First, by using local
government data I am able to capture the effects of extending the franchise on important
infrastructure spending not measured in national government accounts. Second, because
the municipalities all operated in a common institutional and cultural environment, I am
able to isolate the effect of franchise extension from other confounding factors. Third, this
period is of particular interest since, following the Industrial Revolution, town councils were
faced with demands for new public goods—such as clean water and sewer systems—similar
to those required in developing countries today (Gu¨nther and Fink, 2011). Further, the
analysis in Chapter 4 shows that this sanitation expenditure made a large contribution to
the reduction in mortality from waterborne disease in this period. The political obstacles
that councils faced in providing these key infrastructure investments are thus of continuing
relevance.
To identify the effects of extending the franchise to the poor I use plausibly exogenous
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variation in the level of the franchise across time and across towns. While town councils
were elected under a common electoral framework, there remained substantial variation in
the extent of the franchise across towns. This variation resulted partly from nationally
imposed registration requirements, which granted the vote only to heads of household who
had met residence and tax-paying requirements. In addition, the poor law authorities also
maintained some control over which individuals held the right to vote, particularly when
considering the claims of female residents (partially enfranchised in 1869) or renters. Over
time, however, national reforms to the electoral system led to convergence in the extent of
the franchise across towns, providing a further source of exogenous variation that is exploited
in the empirical analysis.
The main specifications test the effect of the franchise on two dependent variables: tax
receipts per capita and public goods expenditure per capita. I estimate panel regressions
with linear and quadratic terms in the franchise, and including time and year fixed effects.
The results show strong and consistent evidence of the proposed relationship: extensions
of the franchise beyond 50% were associated with a decline in both the level of per capita
public goods spending and per capita tax receipts. The results are robust to the inclusion of
time-varying demographic controls, including potential sources of spurious correlation such
as population growth and urban crowding. They are also robust to removing subsets of
towns with very high or low levels of observable characteristics (e.g., very small or very large
towns). Two placebo tests, using variables that we would not expect to be related to the
franchise, show that the relationship is not a spurious artifact of the dataset. Finally, the
results are robust to limiting the analysis to the period immediately before and immediately
after major national reforms to the franchise.
One concern might be that opposition to government expenditure was driven by the fact
that the poor did not understand the health benefits associated with sanitation investments,
rather than a preference for consumption. To test this I examine how the relationship
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between the franchise and different types of public goods changed over time. The results
show that the effect of the franchise on sanitary public goods diminished over time, suggesting
that either growing wealth or knowledge of the benefits of sanitation infrastructure overcame
taxpayer opposition. But the extent of the franchise continued to have the same effect on
other public goods, such as tramways and electric lighting, that became widely available
in the 1890s. This supports the hypothesis that opposition to public goods was based on
income, rather than specific features of sanitation infrastructure.
3.2 Related literature
Local public goods such as sewer systems and clean water had a large impact on mortality
in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, and they continue to do so in developing
countries.1 Yet investment in these key public goods remains insufficient in many countries
(Gu¨nther and Fink, 2011). In recent years, there has been increasing interest in devolving
power over the provision of these public goods to local, democratically elected, institutions
in order to ensure that the interests of all citizens are represented in decision-making (Olken,
2010). However, we do not know how effective democratic governments are in providing
these goods (Ponce-Rodr´ıguez et al., 2012).
Most theories of franchise extension imply that extending the right to vote to the poor
will be associated with an increase in the size of government (e.g., Meltzer and Richard,
1981; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005).2 A cursory look
at the British data (see Figure 3.1) supports this prediction. Between 1860 and 1900 the
average municipal franchise approximately doubled from 9% to 18% of the entire population
1For examples of historical studies see Szreter (2005); Cain and Rotella (2001); Cutler and Miller (2005);
Troesken (2002); Ferrie and Troesken (2008); Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal (2013). For more contemporary
evidence see Zwane and Kremer (2007); Ahuja et al. (2010); Fink et al. (2011); Zhang (2012) and many
others.
2See also Toscani (2012); Conley and Temimi (2001); Justman and Gradstein (1999); Jack and Lagunoff
(2006); Bertocchi (2011); Borck (2007).
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(including children)—coinciding with an even greater increase in public goods expenditure
per capita, and a 30% decline in deaths from cholera and diarrhea.
Figure 3.1: Large decline in mortality coincided with rapid increase in local
expenditure on public goods after 1870. However there remained large
variation in the scale of variation in the size of local government expenditure.
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For details of franchise and financial variables see Appendix 3.A. Right hand panel excludes values above
£2 per capita in 1895 for illustrative purposes.
However, as shown in Figure 3.1, this rapid increase was accompanied by great varia-
tion across different areas, with some towns spending less in 1895 than the median level of
expenditure 20 years previously. Only two-thirds of incorporated towns supplied water in
1900 and the extent of the investment in water supply also varied significantly across towns
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(Wohl, 1983; Millward and Sheard, 1995). This is particularly surprising given the high
rates of social return to these public goods—clean water technologies had a social rate of
return of 23 to 1 in major US cities in the early twentieth-century (Cutler and Miller, 2005).
The results in Chapter 4 indicate that the expenditure that occurred in England and Wales
accounted for between 20% and 40% of the reduction in waterborne mortality between 1871
and 1890.
This paper examines how this variation can be explained by the extent of the franchise
in different towns. The studies cited above generally rely on the assumption that local
governments have control over transfer payments.3 However in practice this is often not true
of local governments, which can face nationally-imposed constraints on their expenditure
powers. This is important, since whereas higher transfers are unambiguously beneficial to
recipients, higher government expenditure on public goods can be subject to a trade-off
between government public good provision and consumption. If all citizens must pay part
of the cost of public goods—as in standard political economy models—the poor may prefer
lower taxes than richer citizens (Epple and Romano, 1996).4
Empirical studies of the effects of the extension of the franchise have focused on national-
or state-level expenditures, and so overlook many of the key infrastructure investments under-
taken at city- or town-level. This limitation has led to a focus on redistributive government
expenditure (e.g., Husted and Kenny, 1997; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt
and Dallal, 2008; Abrams and Settle, 1999) or nationally-funded education services (e.g.,
Stasavage, 2005; Brown and Hunter, 2004; Baum and Lake, 2003). The evidence that is
available does not identify a clear cut effect of franchise extension on the provision of public
3In Meltzer and Richard (1981), for instance, government expenditure is limited only to transfer payments.
In Lizzeri and Persico (2004) government is able to choose from a full schedule of transfer payments and
public goods expenditure.
4Another possibility is that the value (real or perceived) of public goods varies across income groups, due
to differing effects on productivity across industrial sectors (Llavador and Oxoby, 2005) or by increasing the
return to capital and hence wage income (Aidt et al., 2010).
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goods. Female enfranchisement had no effect on investment in sanitation infrastructure be-
tween 1905 and 1930, although this may reflect the fact that by this point large towns had
already invested in these public goods (Miller, 2008). Specifically in the British context, this
paper contradicts the argument of Aidt et al. (2010) that the poor drove the late nineteenth
growth in government expenditure, by utilizing the new comprehensive data set comprising
town finances in all municipal boroughs from 1867 onwards. Outside Britain, there is some
evidence that poorer citizens sometimes oppose government expenditure both historically
and today (Brown, 1988; Harding and Stasavage, 2014; Bursztyn, 2013). More generally, it
does not appear that democratization is associated with lower mortality rates once sample
selection is accounted for (Ross, 2006).5
3.3 Model
This section presents a simple model showing that, if local governments impose linear taxes
and cannot utilize transfer payments, the poor and the rich will desire lower tax rates than
the middle class. In contrast to many previous models, I assume that towns controlled
expenditure over public goods, but could not undertake redistributive transfer payments. I
also impose the standard assumption that councils use linear tax rates. In Section 4.3 I show
that these assumptions closely match the institutional constraints faced by town councils in
nineteenth-century Britain.
The model predicts that, if the franchise is extended first to the rich, then to the middle
class, and then to the poor, the relationship between municipal expenditure and the extent
of the franchise will be inverted-U-shaped. This prediction results from assumptions relating
to the shape of citizens’ utility functions, particularly the fact that the poor have a relatively
5For evidence of a positive relationship between democratization and health outcomes, much of which is
addressed by Ross, see Besley and Kudamatsu (2006); Kudamatsu (2012); Navia and Zweifel (2003); Zweifel
and Navia (2000).
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high marginal utility of consumption. Those assumptions are particularly plausible in a low
income economy, where poorer citizens may struggle to pay for a sufficient food intake or
be forced to live in extremely cramped living quarters. The rich, on the other hand, oppose
higher tax rates because they face a relatively high tax burden.
3.3.1 Framework
Consider an individual i who receives utility from consumption ci and from expenditure on
a local public good g. Utility from the public good is decreasing in the size of the population
N . For instance, a fixed investment in clean water supply may only be able to serve a certain
number of citizens. As such, utility is given by:
Ui = u(ci) + v
( g
N
)
Individuals receive an income yi, with aggregate income denoted by Y . The public good
is funded through a linear tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1], leading to a government budget constraint of
g = τY .
Assume u and v are strictly concave, continuous, twice differentiable and satisfy the
Inada conditions with u(0) = v(0) = 0. In addition, I assume the follow conditions on the
coefficient of relative risk aversion for u(c), rR(c, u) = −cu′′(c)u′(c) .
1. ∂rR(c,u)
∂c
< 0.
2. limc→0 rR(c, u) > 1 and limc→∞ rR(c, u) < 1.
These assumptions state, essentially, that poor individuals are very sensitive to reductions
in consumption, but that this is less true of the wealthy. Intuitively, poor households may be
unwilling to gamble, since any loss means more to them. Ogaki and Zhang (2001) provide
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evidence that this form of utility is appropriate in modern-day developing societies with low
income households.
One type of utility function that meets these conditions is a subset of Hyperbolic Absolute
Risk Aversion (HARA) models (Merton, 1971). In particular, if:
u(ci) =
1− γ
γ
(
βci
(1− γ) − s
)γ
then the conditions are satisfied for s > 0 and 0 < γ < 1. The value s here can be interpreted
as a subsistence level of consumption, from which individuals receive no utility (that is below
this level they are essentially unable to meet their basic needs).
3.3.2 Results
Individual’s optimal tax rates
The assumptions over u and v, combined with assumptions 1 and 2 are sufficient to give the
following proposition.6
Proposition 1. Denote τ ∗i as the optimal tax rate for an individual with income yi. Then
there exists y˜ such that:
1.
∂τ∗i
dyi
≥ 0 for yi ≤ y˜
2.
∂τ∗i
dyi
< 0 for yi > y˜
This proposition states that the optimal tax rate is inverted-U-shaped in income: the
rich and poor desire a lower tax rate (and hence lower government spending per capita)
compared with those with medium levels of income. The preferred tax rate is increasing in
income until a point, y˜, after which the preferred tax rate decreases in income. Intuitively,
this is because at low levels of income citizens cannot “afford” spending on the public good,
6All proofs are contained in the appendix.
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since an increase in taxation moves them to very low levels of disposable income. As income
rises, this cost is reduced, increasing the preferred tax rate. However, at the same time, the
marginal cost of taxation increases since richer citizens have a greater income to be taxed.
Thus eventually demand for per capita public expenditure declines.
Extension of the franchise and public goods expenditure
The discussion above has characterized how citizens’ preferences over taxation change with
income. I now identify the translation of these preferences into the implemented tax rate.
In particular, assume that the tax rate is set by a politician chosen through a standard
two-candidate simple majority election, in which candidates’ promises are binding.
Denote the most limited (that is the initial) electorate as E0 and suppose the right to
vote is extended sequentially in decreasing order of income, such that a citizen i is only
enfranchised once all citizens with yj > yi are already enfranchised. Let τ˜ denote the median
level of τ ∗i for all individuals for whom yi ≥ y˜. That is the median tax rate desired by
individuals who are on the decreasing part of the optimal tax function.
I make the following assumptions on the distribution of income in the town:
3. |{i|yi ≥ y˜, i /∈ E0}| ≥ 2; and
4. |{i|yi < y˜, τi < τ˜}| ≥ 2.
These conditions ensure the electorate will consist first of very rich citizens, then be
extended to some middle income citizens, and finally to very poor citizens. The first condition
states that there are some middle class individuals who are not initially enfranchised. The
second states that there are some individuals sufficiently poor to want a lower tax rate than
the rich.
Proposition 2. Let N and E0 be odd and assume yi 6= yj for i 6= j. Then, given assumptions
3 and 4, the tax rate and amount of government spending per capita will be inverted-U-shaped
in the level of the franchise.
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This proposition states that extensions of the franchise will initially lead to higher tax
rates but then, eventually, lower tax rates.
Growth in town wealth
The final proposition considers the effects of growing town wealth on public goods expen-
diture. This is likely an important factor in explaining the diffusion of public goods over
time, regardless of the extent of the franchise. The effect of increases in average income can
vary depending on how the additional income is distributed, since this will affect the identity
of the median voter. As such, I consider increases in aggregate town income that are dis-
tributed equally across all citizens: i.e., the income of all individuals increases proportionally
to average income. For instance, a 10% increase in average income would be associated with
a 10% increase in every individual’s income.
Proposition 3. Increases in average municipal income are always associated with increases
in expenditure per capita.
This proposition reflects the fact that an increase in average income leads to an increase
in the tax revenue collected (i.e., the tax rate multiplied by aggregate income) at any given
tax rate. As such expenditure in public goods may increase independently of the level of the
franchise.
3.4 Data and identification strategy
I use data from nineteenth-century local governments in England and Wales to test the model.
In this section I first outline the data sources used for this analysis—further detail is provided
in Appendix 3.A. I then discuss the identification strategy underlying the empirical analysis
in three parts. First, I explain how the spending and taxation powers held by town councils
during this period matched the model assumptions. Second, I discuss the exogeneity of the
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franchise variable. Finally, I provide quantitative evidence that extensions of the franchise
led to the enfranchisement of the poor.
3.4.1 Data
Sample
The focus of the empirical analysis will be on incorporated towns in England and Wales—the
so called “municipal boroughs”—which possessed the broadest range of expenditure powers
and were governed under a standardized council system from 1835 onwards. This group
included nearly all the largest towns (except London, which was governed under its own set
of councils). However, it also included a number of small market towns, due to historical
charters obtained prior to the Industrial Revolution. The main specifications focus on a
subset of these towns. In particular, the sample is limited to municipal boroughs that were
both incorporated (i.e., had councils elected under the system described here) and had control
of sanitary expenditure in 1867 (i.e., the start of the study period). A total of 214 towns
had been incorporated by 1867; however only 154 had control of sanitary expenditure prior
to this date. A further four towns are excluded due to either franchise data that appeared
implausibly high (above 90% in some cases) or (in one case) because of difficulties identifying
boundary changes.7 The remaining 150 towns include 92% of the 1881 population of the 214
municipal boroughs incorporated by 1867. Further, it includes all towns with population
above 100,000 in 1881, and 35 of 41 towns with population above 50,000 in 1881.8 The
findings are unchanged using a broader sample—see the discussion of robustness tests in
Section 3.5.3.
7The results are not dependent on the exclusion of these towns.
8These figures exclude West Ham and Croydon, which are suburbs of London and became London Bor-
oughs at a later date.
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Financial data
The analysis uses a new annual panel dataset for the years 1867 to 1904. The dataset
was constructed from the Local Taxation Returns contained in the Parliamentary Papers
collection. These financial accounts detail the sources of revenue and types of expenditure
in each town. Financial values are then translated into constant values using the Rousseaux
Price Index (Mitchell, 1971, pp. 723-4) following Millward and Sheard (1995).
I use this dataset to construct three measures of government revenue and expenditure.
The first is the level of tax revenue per capita. Second, I construct two measures of public
goods expenditure. The first includes all public goods expenditure. This has the advantage
of being available for the whole period from 1867 onwards—expenditure was not generally
disaggregated before 1872. However, given the importance of sanitary infrastructure to eco-
nomic development, I also construct a measure of expenditure on sanitary public goods from
1872 onwards. This measure includes spending on “water supply”, “sewers and sewerage”,
and “highways, scavenging and watering”.9
One concern is that the financial accounts do not differentiate between investment and
ongoing (e.g., maintenance) expenditure on public goods. As a result, it is clear from inspec-
tion of the dataset that there are a large number of extremely high one time expenditures.
To deal with this issue, I construct a measure of ongoing expenditure. To separate ongoing
expenditure from investment expenditure, I first identify “investment periods” by analyzing
deviations in trend expenditure for each type of expenditure. In non-investment periods,
the level of ongoing expenditure is simply the per capita expenditure in that period. In
investment periods, the level of ongoing expenditure is the level of expenditure in the next
non-investment period. For instance, if 1873 and 1874 were investment periods, but 1875
9These categories are those identified as having a sanitary aspect in Millward and Sheard (1995). Note
that the measure of highways includes cleaning of the streets and “scavenging”—which refers to emptying of
privy middens. I combine the measures into a single variable, since some towns did not distinguish between
them in the financial reports.
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was not, then the level of per capita expenditure in 1873 and 1874 is set equal to that in
1875.
Investment periods are identified using both the level and year-on-year increase in expen-
diture.10 An investment period is identified as starting when either a town begins spending
for the first time, when year-on-year expenditure increases by more than 100%, or if the
town’s per capita expenditure is higher than twice the median of per capita expenditure in
the town in future years. An investment period is then identified as continuing until expen-
diture falls significantly again, relatively both to other towns and future expenditure in the
same town. Prior to the existence of disaggregated data in 1872, investment periods are also
identified if expenditure is more than twice the aggregated 1872 ongoing expenditure. The
results are robust to alternative ways of identifying these periods.11pover
Measuring the franchise
My measure of the franchise is the male franchise, since the key prediction of the model
relates to the extension of voting rights to poorer citizens. This is important since using
the total franchise could conflate two (potentially very different) sources of changes in the
franchise: the broadening of the male franchise, and the extension (for the first time) of
the franchise to women. As discussed in detail in Section 4.3, it is reasonable to assume
that growth in the male franchise involves extensions of the right to vote to poorer citizens.
However, this is not necessarily the case for women, since their right to vote depended on
being a head of household, and it is not clear how the preponderance of female household
heads may have varied across income groups.
10See the appendix for more detail on the identification of these investment periods.
11An alternative approach is to simply remove the observations with very high values from the analysis
as outliers: there is still strong support for the inverted-U-relationship, for instance, when excluding the
highest 1% or 5% of observations of expenditure per capita on public goods in year. However this approach
has the difficulty that it may be biased against towns with generally high expenditure, and may lead to bias
by excluding periods when important expenditure did occur.
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I measure the level of municipal franchise for each sex as follows:
Male (female) franchise =
Number of male (female) electors
Male (female) population of voting age
The numerator of the measure is calculated using the number, and gender breakdown,
of municipal electors reported in a number of parliamentary papers for ten cross sections
between 1864 and 1897. The franchise in intervening years is interpolated using a compound
average growth rate. The denominator is calculated using total male and female municipal
population collected from dicennial censuses, adjusted by the estimated proportion of male
and female citizens of voting age, using information from the 1881 census.
To account for potential delays between the date of registration and actual change in
expenditure, I use the value of the franchise lagged by three years. This time lag reflects the
fact that municipal councils were elected across a three year period; the results, however, are
robust to different lag periods (including no lags). To ensure that the results are not driven
exclusively by the tails of the franchise distribution, I also exclude the top and bottom 1%
of franchise values. The results are unchanged when including these observations.
3.4.2 Identification
Historical context fits model assumptions
The powers allocated to local authorities closely mirror the assumptions of the model. First,
towns were governed by locally elected councils, established by the 1835 Municipal Corpo-
rations Act. Councils were chosen under a system of annual elections, with one-third of
councilors replaced each year. Further, it was the town councils that financed and pro-
vided local public goods. These public goods included, in particular, the key sanitary public
goods—including water supply, street cleaning and sewer systems—required to combat the
deterioration in sanitary environments following industrialization. By 1867 the vast major-
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ity of the municipal boroughs had the authority to undertake these large scale public works,
with the remainder receiving such authority in 1872.
Second, municipal governments did not have authority to undertake transfer payments
and did not control welfare (that is poor relief) expenditure (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).
Welfare expenditure was controlled by Boards of Poor Law Guardians, who were elected
separately on a graduated franchise, with district boundaries which often differed substan-
tially from those of the municipalities.
Third, towns’ taxation power was limited to the use of proportional property taxes,
rather than business or income taxation. Because of this limitation, the tax burden was
approximately proportional to household income, as assumed in the model. Further, the
need for increased taxation was a key issue in local political debate. The new demands for
expenditure led to intense taxpayer opposition, often leading to referenda and petitions in
opposition to investment (Hennock, 1973, 1963; Wohl, 1983). This was often true amongst a
“shopocracy” of small property owners (e.g., Yasumoto, 2011; Aidt et al., 2010) and poorer
citizens, who opposed government expenditure since they cared more about their immediate
income than an improved living environment (Hamlin, 1998).
Variation in the municipal franchise
Elections in municipal boroughs occurred under the “municipal franchise”, which was deter-
mined under different legislation to the parliamentary franchise. As shown in Figure 3.2 the
extent of this franchise, measured as a percentage of the adult population, varied consider-
ably across towns and over time.12 In this subsection I explain this variation and argue that
the variation is plausibly exogenous to expenditure on public goods, particularly since much
of the change resulted from national legislation.
The franchise grew significantly between 1865 and 1895, as shown in Figure 3.2, although
12The construction of the franchise measure is discussed in Section 4.3 and in detail in Appendix 3.A.
65
with continued variation in the size of the electorate across towns. This growth resulted
partly from the enfranchisement of women, who gained the right to vote (if they were heads of
household) in 1869. The male franchise also grew over time, with the median level increasing
from around 34% of the adult male population in 1854 to approximately 60% in 1885.
In considering Figure 3.2 it is important to note that the right to vote was only given
to heads of households—rather than to individuals. Since multiple men of voting age could
share a residence (e.g., fathers and sons), the proportion of households enfranchised was
higher than the proportion of voting-age men. This suggests that by the 1880s a very
high proportion of households had the right to vote in these towns. This also explains the
comparatively low level of the female franchise since few women were heads of household
(fewer than 7% of adult women in the 1881 census).13
National legislation provided the basic framework under which the municipal electorate
was determined.14 From 1835 the electorate consisted of all male householders subject to
residence and tax-paying requirements. However, while in theory this electorate was very
broad, in practice the number of voters was frequently significantly below the “theoretical
franchise” (Keith-Lucas, 1952). Poor voters in particular were frequently excluded for two
major reasons. First, the legislation imposed the requirement that voters must have been
resident for at least three years and had to have paid local taxes for at least two and a half
years. Second, citizens also lost the right to vote if they had recently received poor relief.
The requirement that the right to vote was determined by having paid taxes was a
particular source of variation across towns, since it meant that local decisions over whom to
tax determined the size of the electorate. In particular, towns varied in their approach to
assessing occupiers of small dwellings. The low value of these houses often made it costly to
tax them directly, and so in some areas tax collectors collected taxes from landlords, who
13Author’s calculation based on analysis of individual-level census data.
14Interested readers are referred to the appendix for the discussion of the specific Acts that affected the
municipal franchise: for the sake of brevity I refer to legislative changes only by the dates when they occurred.
66
Figure 3.2: The extent of the municipal franchise varied across place and grew
over time.
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from parliamentary papers and decennial censuses. See
Section 4.3 and Appendix 3.A for details.
paid on behalf of their tenants in return for a discount of around of 20–25%. Prior to 1869,
however, the law did not clearly specify whether tenants who did not pay their taxes directly
had the right to vote. Whether these tenants were actually enfranchised thus depended on
the actions of the local authorities: in many cases only the landlord’s name was entered
on the ratebook—and hence the voting register—leading to significant disenfranchisement.
Tenants were able to insist on paying taxes themselves but rarely did so since it required
re-registering around 4 to 6 times each year.
The variation in the franchise resulting from differences in tax policy are plausibly ex-
ogenous to the level of public goods expenditure, since decisions over who was taxed and
how were decided not by the municipal council, but by the authorities responsible for poor
relief. These authorities were elected under a separate franchise under which the rich had
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multiple votes, and with different jurisdictional boundaries (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).
An even stronger cause of exogeneity in the franchise is provided by two national reforms
to the male franchise that occurred in 1869. The first enshrined the right of tenants to vote
even when paying their taxes indirectly through their landlord. The second significantly
reduced the length of residence and tax-paying requirements. The period of residency was
reduced from three years to one—and the length of tax-paying required reduced from two
and half years to six months. These reforms were exogenous to each individual town and
provide a major source of variation in the franchise variable. Further, both of these changes
would be expected to focus on the poor since these citizens were most likely to fail to pay
taxes, move more frequently and to pay taxes through their landlords.
Regressions of franchise against observable characteristics
There are, however, important reasons that part of the variation in the franchise could be
capturing the effects of observable town characteristics. Town population, for instance, is
linked to our franchise variable by definition (since it forms the denominator of the measure),
but might also be related to economies of scale in the provision of sanitation. Similarly both
population growth and urban crowding (defined as population/number of houses) may be
correlated with demand for public goods and also the extent of the franchise. This is because,
first, population growth may be associated with more adults failing to meet the residence
requirements for receiving the franchise. Second, more individuals per household would lead
to individuals being disenfranchised since they were not heads of households.
Appendix Table 3.7 shows that in fact the level of the franchise was correlated with the
level of the franchise in four different cross sections (1866, 1873, 1885 and 1897). As such it
is important to control for these characteristics in the main regressions. To check whether
these controls are sufficient to remove correlation between the level of the franchise and
observable town characteristics, I check whether the remaining variation in the franchise can
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be explained by other characteristics that we might expect to be correlated with expenditure
on public goods. Specifically, I first regress the male franchise on urban crowding, population
growth, the size of town population (split into six bins), and a dummy variable indicating
whether the town was incorporated in 1835. I then regress the residuals of that regression on
four additional variables that we might expect to be correlated with expenditure on public
goods: town population density (in 1871), the town tax base per capita, a dummy variable
identifying whether more than 10% of the town population were engaged in farming in 1881,
and a dummy variable indicating whether more than 5% of the town were engaged in the
textiles industry in 1881. All individual coefficients, as well as joint F-tests, are statistically
insignificant in these residual regressions. This provides reassurance that the observable
characteristics we use in the regressions are sufficient to account for any correlation between
the franchise and other town characteristics affecting town expenditure.
Did the wealthy get the right to vote first?
A key assumption of the model is that the extension of voting rights increased the represen-
tation of the poor, rather than other citizens. In this subsection I test the hypothesis that
the franchise was extended to the wealthy first using the proportion of parliamentary electors
in the electorate as a proxy for town wealth distribution. The right to vote in parliamentary
elections is an indicator that a citizen was relatively wealthy since (unlike the municipal fran-
chise) most citizens could only vote in parliamentary elections if they occupied a property
of at least £10 annual rental value. In 1866 this requirement excluded, on average, around
two-thirds of citizens.15 If extensions of the municipal franchise increased the representation
of relatively poor citizens, then the rich would be more over-represented the smaller the
franchise. We can then measure the over-representation of the wealthy through comparing
15The empirical analysis in this subsection uses data from the 1866 electoral returns (Parliamentary Paper
1866, no. 3626) relating to the approximately 150 municipal boroughs which had boundaries coextensive
with parliamentary constituencies in 1866.
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the percentage of parliamentary voters in the municipal electorate to the percentage of par-
liamentary voters in the entire population. Specifically, we can measure over-representation
as follows:
Over-representation =
% Parliamentary electors in municipal electorate
% Parliamentary electors in population
where “population” refers to the number of male occupiers in the town—that is the
potential electorate under the male household franchise. If the electorate were entirely rep-
resentative, we would expect the measure to equal one. If the wealthy were over-represented,
on the other hand, then the number will be greater than one.
As shown in the left hand panel of Figure 3.3, in 1866 there was a clear negative rela-
tionship between the extent of over-representation and the extent of the municipal franchise.
This relationship indicates that the electorate was more representative of relatively poor
citizens when the franchise was higher. After the reforms of 1869, however, the downward-
sloping relationship had disappeared—in 1876 there is no relationship between the extent of
the franchise and the make-up of the pre-reform electorate. Further, the largest increases
in the franchise occurred in those towns where the parliamentary electors were most over-
represented, providing further evidence that the effects of the reforms was to extend the vote
to poorer citizens.
Poverty in Britain 1860-1900
A key part of our argument is that poorer citizens opposed expenditure due to income
constraints. An important question is then what the poor were “giving up” in return for
greater government expenditure. Answering this question is complicated, since it relies on
understanding not only average incomes—a difficult task in itself—but also elements of the
income distribution. However, it is possible to glean some insights into the type of constraints
the poor were facing using contemporary data from specific places, at particular points in
70
Figure 3.3: Over-representation of wealthier citizens predicts extent of
franchise before, but not after 1869 reforms.
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time. In particular, we can use these sources to provide some crude indication both the
proportion of the urban population in poverty, and also how the poor spent increases in
income. A detailed discussion of these questions is presented in Appendix D: in this sub-
section I provide a summary of the results presented there.
First, I use Rowntree’s well-known 1901 survey of York to identify the financial constraints
faced by households at different levels of income—how much income was needed to escape
poverty? This survey provides crude estimates of the proportion of households living beneath
the poverty line in 1899. I then back-cast these estimates to provide an indication of the
proportion of the population living in different levels of poverty in earlier years. The results
indicate that a substantial portion of the urban population lived in poverty. Approximately
40% of urban households are estimated to have lived in “primary poverty”—indicating that
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individuals did not receive sufficient calories to achieve “minimum physical efficiency”—in
1860, falling to 16% in 1880 and 5% in 1914. However, a much larger proportion were
estimated to live in under a more general qualitative measure of poverty—associated with
living in squalor—with estimates indicating that up to three-quarters of individuals faced
these constraints in 1860, falling to 27% in 1914. These figures seem high, reflecting the
fact that they represent perceptions of what constituted poverty forty years later, and so we
must be cautious in interpreting them. However, they are useful in indicating that a high
share of the population were likely facing important financial constraints during the period.
To understand in more detail what these constraints meant in practical terms, I estimate
the income elasticities of the poor citizens using contemporary (1890) budget data for a sam-
ple of approximately 1,000 households (obtained from Haines (2006)). This analysis suggests
that at very low levels of income, individuals used added income to increase their spending
on rent and began to switch to higher quality foods—–including meat, vegetables and fruit.
As income increased further, individuals continued to increase the share of their spending on
quality food, but also began to purchase more leisure goods (e.g., alcohol and tobacco). This
suggests that the trade-offs the poor faced in voting against greater expenditure on public
goods were between better sanitation and expenditure that could lead to improved health
through improvements in nutrition.
3.5 Empirical results
In this section I test the key hypothesis of the model: that the relationship between the
extent of the franchise and per capita expenditure on public goods is inverted-U-shaped. I
first present simple semi-parametric plots of the data, followed by panel regressions that show
the relationship is robust to the inclusion of time-varying town characteristics and town- and
year-fixed effects. The subsequent subsection discusses the robustness of the results, using
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the reforms of 1869 as a source of exogenous variation and presenting two placebo tests. The
final subsection shows that the magnitude of the reforms was large, but that the effect on
sanitary expenditure weakened over time.
3.5.1 Semi-parametric analysis
Figure 3.4 plots the relationship between the male franchise (on the x-axis) and both tax
revenue per capita (left hand panel) and public goods expenditure per capita (right hand
panel), after controlling for year- and town- fixed effects. The y-variable in each figure is
calculated by regressing the relevant dependent variable on year and town dummies, and then
estimating the residuals. The figure presents a Nadaraya-Watson non-parametric regression
of these residuals against the male franchise.
Both panels show clear evidence of the inverted-U-relationship. In both, there is evidence
that the dependent variable increases until a franchise of approximately 50%, and then
declines beyond this point. This represents around the median level of the franchise prior to
the reforms of 1869, and around the 25th percentile of the franchise immediately following
the reforms.
3.5.2 Panel regressions
The figures above show clear evidence of the inverted-U-relationship. In this subsection I
use panel regressions to test whether this relationship remains after controlling for potential
confounding factors.
I use a quadratic specification:
gi,t = α + β1franchisei,t + β2franchise
2
i,t + γXi,t + γ0Zi + δyear + i,t
where i indexes towns, t indexes year and  is an error term. The vector X includes town-
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Figure 3.4: Semi-parametric approach shows inverted-U-relationship with per
capita tax receipts and expenditure, using Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric
regression of residuals from regression against year and town dummies.
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specific time-varying controls including urban crowding (measured as number of houses/population),
population growth, the extent of the female franchise, and population. To allow for poten-
tial economies of scale in the provision of these public goods, population is binned into six
categories.16 Importantly, the panel structure also allows us to control for characteristics of
16The bins used are: less than 10,000 citizens, 10,000-25,000, 25,000-50000, 50,000-100,000, 100,000-250,000
and greater than 250,000 citizens. The exact definition or number of the bins is not important to the results.
For instance, the main results hold with population binned by decile.
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towns—e.g., location—that do not vary over time, as well as time trends. All our specifica-
tions include town level (Z) and year fixed effects (year) that account for any time-invariant
aspects of towns that may affect the level of expenditure.
The panel structure of the dataset means that the data is likely to suffer from serial
correlation. While this will not bias the estimated regression coefficients, it may bias the
size of the standard errors downwards. To adjust for this I cluster standard errors at the
town-level in all regressions, allowing for any form of error correlation structure within towns.
As an additional test of robustness to serial correlation, I run an additional specification
including one and two lags of the dependent variables. The results, which are presented in
the appendix, are consistent with the main findings.
The existence of an inverted-U-shape relationship implies β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. As well
as the individual statistical significance of these coefficients, I also check that the estimated
turning point is within the interior of the franchise range, and that the two franchise terms
are jointly significant with an F-test of joint significance. In addition, I use the test for
U-shaped relationships developed in Lind and Mehlum (2010). This test adjusts for the
fact that an inverted-U-relationship implies that the relationship between the franchise and
the dependent variable must be decreasing before the turning point and increasing after—a
joint restriction that may lead to problems when the estimated turning point is near the
extremum of the dataset.
The results are presented in Table 3.1. Specifications (1) and (2) use tax receipts per
capita as the dependent variable, while specifications (3) and (4) use public goods expen-
diture per capita as the dependent variable. Specifications (1) and (3) include only the
measure of the male franchise and franchise squared, while specifications (2) and (4) include
the control variables discussed above. To aid interpretation, the franchise variable is mea-
sured in terms of a 10% increase, while the dependent variable is standardized. As such, the
coefficient on the franchise variable represents the effect of a 10% change in the proportion
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of men enfranchised as a proportion of a standard deviation of the dependent variable.
The inverted-U-relationship is strongly supported in all specifications, with both the
individual coefficients and joint tests strongly statistically significant. The addition of the
control variables does, however, reduce the size of the franchise coefficients in the regression
of public goods expenditure per capita by around one-sixth. We discuss the magnitudes of
these effects further below.
Table 3.1: Fixed effects regressions show inverted-U-hypothesis, with and
without control variables.
Tax receipts p.c. Public goods spend p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male franchise 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.58*** 0.47***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15)
Male franchise sq -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
No. obs 4850 4850 4850 4850
No. towns 150 150 150 150
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Town Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Popn. controls N Y N Y
Franchise turning point (%) 45 44 54 53
F-test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
U-test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dependent variables are standardized. Franchise coefficients represent the effect of a 10% increase in the
franchise. Population controls include town population (in six bins), urban crowding, decadal population
growth, and female franchise. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by town, and are displayed in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.5.3 Additional tests for exogeneity of franchise and robustness
The previous subsection shows clear and consistent evidence of an inverted-U-relationship
between the level of the franchise and the size of government. By controlling for key town
characteristics, as well as time-invariant town features, we have been able to account for
many potential confounding factors. However, some readers may still be concerned that
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our franchise measure is capturing the effects of other, unobserved, variables that are also
correlated with the size of government, and that lead to the inverted-U-shaped relationship.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the analysis in Table 3.7 in the appendix provides evidence
that our control variables are sufficient to capture these effects—particularly when combined
with the inclusion of town fixed effects. Further, the most likely relationship between these
variables biases against our hypothesis. In particular, we might expect that high population
growth and high urban crowding would be associated with both a low franchise (as explained
above) and a high level of expenditure on public goods—contradicting our findings. This is
because both variables are likely to reflect rapid urbanization and so, if anything, would be
associated with a higher demand for sanitation infrastructure and other public goods.
I address any lingering concerns in three ways. First, I seek to control directly for
additional potential confounding effects by controlling for town tax base per capita, and by
allowing for differing polynomial time trends according to 1871 town characteristics. Second,
I restrict the analysis to focus on the period close to the 1869 reforms to the franchise. As
explained in Section 4.3, these reforms comprised the single largest change to the franchise
across the period of study. Focusing the analysis on the years immediately before and after
these reforms therefore provides confidence that we are directly capturing the effects of the
changing franchise, rather than other variables.
Third, I undertake two placebo tests by re-estimating the quadratic specification using
two dependent variables that we would not expect to be affected by the franchise: per capita
revenue from rents and property sales, and per capita expenditure on “lunatics”. I then check
that there is, in fact, no evidence of the inverted-U-relationship in this case. This confirms
that the finding of the inverted-U-relationship is not a spurious relationship created, in some
way, by the structure of the dataset.
Fourth, I carry out a further set of robustness checks, varying the specification used and
removing differing groups of towns from the sample. This ensures that the results are not
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dependent on a particular empirical framework or towns with specific characteristics. The
results show consistently strong evidence of the inverted-U-relationship.
Controls for tax base and complex time trends
As a further test that we are capturing a causal relationship, I include additional control
variables to capture potential sources of spurious correlation with the franchise. First, I
include as a control variable a measure of the size of the tax base per capita in each town. This
measure represents the aggregate “rateable” value of property in the district—including both
houses and other forms of property. Including this variable acts as a proxy for town wealth,
and in particular checks that the inverted-U-relationship is not driven by a relationship
between the size of the tax base and decisions over who to tax: for instance if wealthier
towns were more able to avoiding taxing the poor in order to deny them the right to vote.
Data regarding the level of the tax base per capita is available (almost) annually from 1872
onwards, and also for 1866 and 1870: values for missing years are interpolated linearly. I
use a three year moving average to provide a smoother measure of the tax base available to
town councils.17
Second, I include interactions between the 1871 levels of the three major correlates with
the franchise discussed above (population, urban crowding, and population growth) and a
fourth-order polynomial in time. By doing so, we allow for differences in the time path of the
dependent variables according to these observable characteristics. This accounts for factors
that might affect public health expenditure and be correlated with the franchise indirectly
through these characteristics: for instance if public health movements began in more highly
crowded cities in the early 1870s. (See Gentzkow (2006) for a previous application of this
approach.)
17Further discussion of the construction of this variable are provided in the appendix. Given these mea-
surement difficulties, I have also experimented with binning the tax base variable into several quantiles, but
this did not substantially change the results.
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Table 3.2 presents the results of these regressions; specifications (1) and (5) include the
controls for tax base per capita, while the remaining specifications include the interactions
between the observable characteristics and the fourth-order polynomial in time. There is
clear evidence of the inverted-U-relationship in all eight specifications, with both the linear
and quadratic terms statistically significant in all cases. The joint tests of significance are
also statistically significant in all cases. Further, the estimated turning points remain similar
to those reported in the main regressions. As such these results provide further reassurance
that we are capturing idiosyncratic variation in the franchise.
Table 3.2: Inverted-U-shape relationship is robust to inclusion of controls for
wealth and interactions between control variables and time-polynomial.
Tax receipts p.c. Public goods spend p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male franchise 0.28** 0.25** 0.24* 0.27** 0.38*** 0.30** 0.46*** 0.39**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
Male franchise sq -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. obs 4695 4850 4850 4850 4695 4850 4850 4850
No. towns 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Town FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Popn. controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tax base p.c. Y N N N Y N N N
Popn-time interaction N Y N N N Y N N
Crowd-time interaction N N Y N N N Y N
Growth-time interaction N N N Y N N N Y
Fran. turn point (%) 39 41 39 41 51 55 54 53
F-test (p-val) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.04
U-test (p-val) 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02
Dependent variables are standardized. Franchise coefficients represent the effect of a 10% increase in the franchise.
Population controls include town population (in six bins), urban crowding, decadal population growth, and female
franchise. Time interactions reflect the interaction between the value of the relevant observable characteristic in 1871
(population, urban crowding and population growth, respectively) and a fourth-order time polynomial. Note that the
1871 levels of these variables are captured by the town fixed effects. Tax base per capita measures a three year mov-
ing average in the level of the rateable value per capita in each town. The number of observations is reduced in these
regressions due to missing data in earlier years. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by town, and are displayed
in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Reforms of 1869
As detailed in Section 4.3 the reforms of 1869 acted as a considerable shock to the franchise,
leading to rapid growth in the franchise within a five-year period, and continued growth
over a ten year period as towns slowly adjusted to the new regulations. The simplest way
to use this exogenously-imposed variation is to test that the inverted-U-relationship holds
over the years immediately preceding and following these reforms. Over this shorter period
there are less likely to be major changes in other variables, providing reassurance that we are
capturing the effects of changes in the franchise. In particular, I repeat the quadratic tests
above, but limit the analysis to three periods. Specifically, I include the year immediately
before the reforms (1868), one year following the initial shock to the franchise and using the
1873 franchise data (1876), and one year using the franchise data a decade after the reforms—
i.e., once the level of the franchise had stabilized across different towns (1882). The results,
displayed in Appendix 3.E, again provide clear evidence of the inverted-U-relationship with
all individual coefficients statistically significant at a 5% level.
Placebo tests
I undertake two placebo tests to ensure that that the results are not a spurious artifact of the
dataset. In particular, I re-estimate the quadratic specification using two dependent variables
that we would not expect to be related to the franchise: per capita receipts from “rents
and property sales”, and the per capita expenditure on the maintenance of “lunatics” and
asylums. We would not expect rent receipts to be directly connected to the franchise, since
they are likely based on exogenous holdings of land. Similarly, responsibilities for lunatic
payments were defined by external legislation, and depended on the number of paupers in a
town—which was determined by the (separately elected) Poor Law Unions.18
18Unfortunately, these variables are only available from 1872 onwards. Other results, available from the
author upon request, show that the results in Table 3.1 also hold for this smaller period.
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Table 3.3 presents the results of these tests. As expected, none of the individual or joint
tests are statistically significant and in specifications (1) and (2) the coefficients have the
incorrect sign.
Table 3.3: Placebo tests show no relationship with the franchise.
Receipts from rents p.c. Expenditure p.c. on lunatics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male franchise -0.02 -0.07 0.25 0.27
(0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20)
Male franchise sq 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No. obs 4216 4216 4215 4215
No. towns 150 150 150 150
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Town Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Popn. controls N Y N Y
Franchise turning point (%) 38 46 70 67
F-test (p-val) 0.98 0.94 0.38 0.38
Dependent variables are standardized. Franchise coefficients represent the effect of a 10% increase in the fran-
chise. Population controls include town population (in six bins), urban crowding, decadal population growth,
and female franchise. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by town, and are displayed in parentheses.
Change in franchise represents the effect of a 10% increase. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by town,
and are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.5.4 Additional robustness checks
I have also undertaken a number of additional robustness checks on the results. First, I
have tested alternative polynomial specifications, including a linear specification and poly-
nomial specifications including franchise terms up to order six. In no case are any of the
higher-order terms statistically significant at the 10% level. There is narrow statistical sig-
nificance in the linear specification for the tax regression, but this is much weaker than
in the quadratic specification, and the quadratic specification is preferred under both the
Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria. In addition, I have varied the groups of towns
included in the specification, including i) focusing on a balanced panel of towns, ii) includ-
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ing towns that received sanitary authority after 1872 and iii) including towns excluded as
outliers due to very high or very low values of the franchise. Second, I vary the definition
of the franchise variable—including using different lag lengths, and alternative measures of
population. As an additional check that our results are not capturing other characteristics
of towns, I also tested the robustness of the results when removing towns with “extreme”
1871 characteristics, defined as being in the top bottom 10% or top 90% of the distribution
of three variables: population, urban crowding and population growth. In addition, I tested
the robustness to limiting the sample to towns incorporated in 1835. The results are sup-
ported in all regressions, with strong statistical significance in the expenditure regressions in
particular.
3.5.5 Magnitude of the effects
The previous results have shown consistent evidence of the inverted-U-relationship until
1900—both for public goods expenditure per capita and for tax receipts per capita. In this
section I show that these effects were large.
Figure 3.5 plots the estimated effect of extending the franchise using the results from
Table 3.1 above. To provide a sense of scale, the effect is measured as a percentage of the
median of the dependent variable across all towns between 1867 and 1900. An extension
of the franchise from 30% to 40%, for example, is estimated to have led to an increase in
taxation per capita of around 5% of the median level of taxation across the period. The
changes in the franchise had an even bigger impact on public goods expenditure. An increase
of the franchise from the maximum (at 53%) to 75% led to an estimated decline of over 15%
of the median expenditure per capita.
While these effects were sizable, they may have changed over time as new public goods
became available. In particular, the model predicts that, as aggregate town income increases
expenditure on public goods will increase. Over time therefore, we would expect the overall
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Figure 3.5: Franchise extensions had sizable effect on the level of taxation and
expenditure per capita, measured as a percentage of the median between 1867
and 1900.
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level of expenditure to increase and, possibly, that the relationship with the franchise will
weaken. To explore this, I analyze the changing relationship between the franchise with both
“all public goods” (our main dependent variable) and “sanitary public goods”—water supply,
sewers, street cleaning and refuse collection. This also lets us assess the extent to which the
inverted-U-shape hypothesis applies to public goods in general, or whether it was limited
to specific public goods. This is particularly important, since it provides some indication of
whether opposition to greater expenditure might have been driven by, for example, a lack of
understanding of the health benefits associated with sanitary public goods.
Figure 3.6 explores this possibility via a rolling regression in which I extend the sample by
one year at a time. That is, the first regression covers the period 1872–1886, the second 1872–
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1887, etc. I then plot the estimated coefficient for the quadratic term on the franchise for “all
public goods” and “sanitary public goods” separately over time (that is, the y-axis measures
the β2 term in main specification). This provides an indication of the changing size of the
relationship between the franchise and expenditure across the period. For comparability,
both dependent variables are standardized in terms of standard deviations of the all public
goods variable.
The figure shows that at the beginning of the period, the effect size is similar across
the two categories: the effect of the franchise was focused on the important sanitary public
goods. Over time, however, the size of the effect of the franchise on expenditure sanitary
public goods decreased, supporting the hypothesis that growing wealth gradually overcame
taxpayer opposition to greater expenditure on these public goods. However, the relationship
between the franchise and all public goods expenditure actually grew, reflecting the greater
levels of expenditure that occurred towards the end of the period as new public goods, such
as tramways and electric lighting, became available. Again, expenditure on these public
goods was highest in towns with intermediate levels of the franchise.
3.6 Discussion
These results show that the relationship between the franchise and public goods expenditure
was inverted-U-shaped: expenditure was highest at intermediate levels of the franchise. This
finding is robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, town-level fixed effects,
and exclusions of specific groups of towns. The relationship is supported when focusing on
the 1869 national reforms as an exogenous shock to the franchise. Further, placebo tests
show that the relationship does not apply to variables not under the control of the town
council, indicating the relationship is not an artifact of the dataset.
I have proposed a simple model that explains this relationship through differences in
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Figure 3.6: The effect of the franchise on sanitary public goods changed over
time; however the effect on new infrastructure, such as tramways, remained
large.
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demand for public goods at different levels of wealth. Essentially the poor cannot “afford”
public goods (they have a higher marginal utility from consumption), whereas the rich must
pay a higher price (since their absolute tax burden is higher). This fits with historical
evidence that shows that middle class reformers often struggled to win the support of the
poor in pushing for sanitary investment.
Despite the opposition to public expenditure, it is clear that investment in sanitation
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grew over time. This could be a result of growing demand for sanitation as population
grew, placing greater and greater pressure on existing systems. Alternatively, it could be
a reflection of diffusion of knowledge, as the benefits of sanitation became more widely
known over time. Third, greater investment could be a result of growing wealth, leading to
higher marginal rates of taxation and hence investment across the board. This explanation
is supported by the fact that the inverted-U-relationship applied not only to sanitation
infrastructure, but also public goods such as tramways and electric lighting. This suggests
that opposition to sanitation investment was not driven purely by a lack of understanding
of the health benefits, but reflected more general factors.
These results have important implications for ongoing debates regarding the benefits of
decentralization of expenditure powers to local government bodies. We frequently assume
that poorer citizens will be willing to vote for public goods expenditure. However, this may
only be true if they are able to pass the cost onto the rich. In the setting examined here,
this was not possible due to a reliance on property taxation; today many local governments
face similar constraints on their ability to raise taxation. In other settings, many of the tax
costs associated with environmental change such as gas taxes or airplane charges are also
regressive. Identifying these constraints is critical to understanding why change does—or
often does not—occur.
Finally, the evidence presented here suggests a return to Lizzeri and Persico’s (2004)
question: if it would lead to a decrease in public goods expenditure, why would the elites
extend the franchise? One possibility is that extensions occurred in a period when the
wealthy could still control how the poor voted either by manipulating the registration list
or through directing them how to vote. After the reforms of 1869 and the secret ballot of
1872, however, that became much more difficult. Alternatively, it may be that the changes
in the municipal franchise were a reflection of national changes following the Second Reform
Act of 1867. The growth of party politics during this period created new requirements for
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party agents to find and register supporters, and this may have spilled down to the level of
municipal elections. Both of these are questions for future research.
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3.A Data
The majority of the data used in the paper are drawn from reports to Parliament downloaded
from the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Database19. A full list of the reports used
is available upon request. Other sources are discussed below.
3.A.1 Financial data
Information is collected from the annual financial accounts reported to Parliament and col-
lated in the Local Taxation Returns contained in the Parliamentary Papers collection.20
These accounts contain detail on the sources of revenue and types of expenditure in each
town annually. Each town reported separately as both a municipal borough and as a sanitary
authority (as a local board, improvement commission or urban sanitary authority): these
accounts are aggregated together. This information is used to construct an annual panel
dataset between 1867 and 1910.21 Financial values are then translated into current prices
using the Rousseaux Price Index (Mitchell, 1971, pp. 723–4) following Millward and Sheard
(1995).
Defining ongoing public goods expenditure
Prior to 1884 the financial data does not distinguish between one-off and ongoing expen-
diture items: as such the accounts include a number of very high expenditures, reflecting
investment activities. To separate ongoing expenditure from investment expenditure for dif-
ferent types of public good, I first identify “investment periods” by analyzing deviations in
trend expenditure in each of the following categories “sewerage and sewer systems”, “wa-
ter supply”, “highways, watering and scavenging”, and “other public works”. The first
three of these categories are defined separately in the financial reports. The “other public
19See http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/
20A full list of the parliamentary papers used is available from the author upon request.
21Comprehensive data is not available prior to 1867.
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works” series is the aggregate of (loan and nonloan) expenditure on “other public works”,
“markets”, “lighting”, “lighting and sewers”, “electric lighting”, “tramways” “municipal
buildings”, “bridges”, “housing”, “asylums”, “libraries”, “burial”, “baths”, “hospitals”, and
“other”. In non-investment periods, the level of ongoing expenditure is simply the per capita
expenditure in that period. In investment periods, the level of ongoing expenditure is the
level of expenditure in the next non-investment period. For instance, if 1873 and 1874 were
investment periods, but 1875 was not, then the level of expenditure in 1873 and 1874 is set
equal to that in 1875.
For the period following 1871, a year is identified as the beginning of an investment period
for each good if:
1. Expenditure per capita exceeds the median percentile of expenditure per capita (across
all towns and years) in the relevant category; and:
• the town started expenditure on the relevant good in that period (the spending
in the previous period was 0); or
• there is a 100% year-on-year growth in expenditure on the good, and the expen-
diture p.c. exceeds the median future per capita spending for the town; or
• the two previous years of data are missing, and the expenditure p.c. exceeds the
median future per capita spending for the town; or
• the level of expenditure p.c. is higher than the previous year and twice the median
future per capita spending for the town.
The years following the start of an investment period are identified as investment periods if
either:
1. expenditure p.c. is greater than the previous period; or
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2. the expenditure p.c. exceeds the median future per capita spending for the town; and
either:
• the expenditure is twice the town’s average expenditure over the period; or
• the level of expenditure exceeds the median percentile of expenditure per capita
(across all towns and years) in the relevant category.
Between 1867 and 1871, public goods expenditure is not disaggregated in the financial
reports, and so we cannot use the process above. Instead, investment periods are identified
as being twice the level of ongoing expenditure in 1872, and the above process is then applied
to total public goods expenditure in those towns.22
Definition of dependent variables used in regressions
Tax receipts: Aggregation of all different “rates” collected by towns as municipality and
sanitary authority.
Sanitary public goods expenditure: Sum of ongoing expenditure per capita on “sewerage
and sewer systems”, “water supply”, “highways, watering and scavenging”. See previous
subsection for details of construction of series.
All public goods expenditure: After 1872, sum of “sanitary public goods expenditure” and
ongoing expenditure on “other public works” series (see previous subsection for details).
Prior to 1872, total of expenditure on “public works” and on sewerage and lighting.
Tax base per capita
Information on the value of the tax base (the “rateable value” of the district) is reported
annually in the Local Taxation Returns from 1872 onward, with the exception of 1883. For
many years, the tax base is reported separately for the town as a sanitary district, and as
a municipal borough. Before 1872 information regarding the annual value of the tax base
was not reported alongside the financial accounts. However, there is some data available
22For a small number of towns the first period that disaggregated data was available is later than than
1872: in this case investment periods are defined relative to the first period data is available.
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regarding the size of the tax base in 1867 and 1870—however, this relates only to the sanitary
districts and not the municipal boroughs. We use this information to construct an annual
time series by i) using the maximum reported tax base by a town in each year and ii) linearly
interpolating values for missing years.
The need to interpolate missing values leads to one potential source of measurement
error in these estimates. A further concern is that before 1872 we may underestimate the
tax base, because we do not have information on the tax base reported as a municipal
borough. While towns generally reported similar values under both categories, there were
sometimes significant differences, reflecting factors such as local exemptions and discounting
for tax purposes. Further, this is particularly concerning since this effect could differ across
towns, and is focused on the period before the 1869 reforms—an important period for the
analysis. Given these concerns, we measure the tax base per capita as a rolling three year
average (for non-interpolated years) to smooth the effect of potential year to year changes.
I have also checked that the results are robust to binning the tax base per capita variable.
3.A.2 Electoral data
Information as to the number of electors was collected from returns to Parliament supple-
mented by information for 1879 reported in Vine (1879). Information for the total number of
electors in each town was collected for years 1850, 1852, 1854, 1852–1866, 1869, 1871, 1873,
1879, 1883, 1885 and 1897. Information broken down by gender was collected for 1871, 1885,
and 1897. Values relating to the number of electors in Shaftesbury (for all years), Carlisle
(1854) and Buckingham (1866, 1869, and 1873) were excluded, since there were clear discrep-
ancies in the returns (for instance, where the number of parliamentary electors was reported
rather than the number of municipal electors).
The time series for total number of electors was estimated as follows. First, the franchise
is calculated as a percentage of the total population, using the series relating to the number
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of electors above. The missing years are then interpolated using a constant compound growth
rate—with the exception of the years 1867 and 1868 which are replaced with the 1866 value,
since reforms in 1869 led to a large jump in the level of the franchise. Missing values for
1864 and 1865 are replaced with the value from 1866.
To estimate the male / female franchise used in the main specifications, I first estimate
the proportion of male electors in 1871, 1885, and 1897. This series is then interpolated at
a constant growth rate for the intervening years. (In general this proportion did not tend to
change substantially between periods). Multiplying these two series provides an estimate of
the number of male and female electors in each year. The franchise measure is then estimated
using the estimated adult male population discussed in the following two subsections.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the key franchise variable used in the paper is calculated
using an adjustment factor relating to proportion of males and females that were of voting
age (21 and 30 respectively). The main measure uses individual-level census data obtained
from the North Atlantic Population Project (Minnesota Population Center, 2008; Schu¨rer
and Woollard, 2003). The individual-level data is aggregated to identify the age distribution
of voters at the level of administrative sub-districts.23 Each town was then matched to
the relevant sub-districts using the 1881 census: often each municipal borough was spread
across several of these sub-districts (the boundaries did not, unfortunately, overlap directly).
To estimate the town-level age distribution I then average across the different sub-districts,
weighted by the proportion of 1881 population in each of the sub-districts (which is also
identified in the 1881 census).
While this measure should accurately account for variation in the age distribution across
towns, one potential concern is the use of a constant adjustment factor for every year. To
check whether this is an issue, I compare the estimated proportion to data from the period
1861–1870 collected from the decennial reports of the Registrar General. Unfortunately, this
23More precisely, these are the registration sub-districts used by the Registrar General.
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data is only available at the level of the registration district rather than sub-district, and so
can be matched to towns less precisely.24
The left hand panel of Figure 3.7 compares the estimated percentage of the male pop-
ulation over 20 using the two measures in large (over 20,000 population) towns—which
correspond most closely to registration districts and hence are more comparable over time.
The right hand panel compares the estimated franchise in 1881 using the two measures. The
resulting comparison shows a very high degree of correlation over time in the town age dis-
tribution, providing confidence that our use of a constant adjustment factor is appropriate.
Further, the results are robust to these different measures of the franchise.
Figure 3.7: High correlation in franchise variable using different age
distribution measures
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24Smaller boroughs were often only a small part of a registration district. As such this measure combines
urban and rural areas.
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3.A.3 Census data
Characteristics of urban areas, including population and number of houses, were gathered
from a series of census reports between 1861 and 1901, and the parish-level population
statistics for the 1911 census gathered by Southall (2004). Between censuses the population
is interpolated at a constant annual growth rate. In several cases, however, towns underwent
boundary changes between census years. To adjust for this, I have identified the towns that
underwent boundary changes using the census and the year of the boundary changes using
both the census reports themselves and the annual reports of the Local Government Board.
The population series is adjusted to the revised population (provided in the census reports)
at this date.
3.B Key legislation affecting the municipal franchise
1835 Municipal Corporation Act: Established the structure of municipal councils in 178
towns with historic charters, with unincorporated towns allowed to petition for incorporation
at a later date. Under the terms of this Act, councils were chosen under a system of annual
elections (with one third of councilors replaced each year) by an electorate consisting of all
male householders subject to residence and tax-paying requirements. Prior to 1835 female
householders were able to vote in some towns, but were disenfranchised by the Act. In order
to vote citizens had to have resided in the relevant municipal borough for three years and
paid local property taxes (the “rates”) for 2.5 years prior to the election. This included
a stipulation that individuals were ineligible to vote if they had received poor relief in the
twelve months prior to an election. Precisely, they had to have occupied a property (e.g., a
house or shop) in the town and lived within seven miles of the borough.
1850 Small Tenements Rating Act: This Act gave local authorities the ability to collect
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taxes directly from landlords for poorer tenants, on the condition that the tenants were
granted the municipal franchise. This practice was known as “compounding”, with the
tenants whose taxes were collected in this way known as “compounders”. In particular, the
Act applied to those in tenements of annual rateable value of 6 pounds or under. This decision
was not taken by the municipal council, but by the local vestry, who held responsibility for
tax collection.25
1869 Assessed Rates Act: This Act enshrined the right of compounders to vote.
1869 Municipal Franchise Act: This Act reduced the period of residency from three
years to one—and the length of tax-paying required from two and half years to six months.
The Act also enfranchised female householders aged 30 or older.
3.C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Individuals consume whatever remains after taxation ci = yi(1− τ). Denote average
income as y¯ = Y
N
. Then the individual’s problem is
max
τi
U = u(yi(1− τi)) + v(τiy¯)
First note that this problem has a unique maximum since U(ci, g) is strictly concave.
In addition, the assumption that both u(·) and v(·) functions satisfy the Inada conditions
ensures an interior solution as long as u(yi) > 0 (i.e., utility is positive when all income is
spent on consumption).
25Vestries were the governing body of parishes which, after 1834, did not hold responsibility for deciding the
level of taxation or spending. There were generally several parishes within each town (although boundaries
did not coincide).
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Taking the first-order conditions, the optimal τ ∗ is implicitly defined by the equation:
yiu
′(c∗i ) = y¯v
′(τ ∗i y¯) (3.1)
where c∗i = yi(1− τ ∗i ).
As yi increases, it must be the case that c
∗
i increases. To see this, consider otherwise.
Since consumption is lower, the value of the left hand side would increase relative to the
right hand side. Further for consumption to fall, the tax rate must be higher. But then the
right hand side of the equation will decrease, meaning there is no equilibrium.
Now, note that the left hand side of (3.1) is the marginal cost of raising taxation. Then
the derivative of the marginal cost with respect to yi at τi is given by:
u′(c∗i ) + yi(1− τ ∗i )u′′(c∗i ) (3.2)
When this expression is negative, the marginal cost of taxation is decreasing as yi in-
creases: thus the optimal tax rate is increasing in yi. In contrast, if the expression is positive,
then the optimal tax rate will be decreasing in yi. For simplicity I denote rR(c
∗
i , u) as rR.
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The optimal tax rate is increasing in income if:
u′(c∗i ) + yi(1− τ ∗i )u′′(c∗i ) ≤ 0
− u
′(c∗i )
yiu′′(c∗i )
≤ (1− τ ∗i )
1 +
u′(c∗i )
yiu′′(c∗i )
≥ τ ∗i
1− 1yi
ci
rR
≥ τ ∗i
1− (1− τ
∗
i )yi
yi
1
rR
≥ τ ∗i
1− (1− τ
∗
i )
rR
≥ τ ∗i
rR − 1 ≥ (rR − 1)τ ∗i
If rR−1 > 0, this gives 1 ≥ τ ∗i . If, on the other hand, rR−1 < 0 this gives 1 ≤ τ ∗i . Implicitly
define y˜ by rR(yi(1− τ ∗i )) = 1. Then by assumption 2 ∃yi < y˜. We know that τ ∗i < 1 since
u(·), v(·) satisfy the Inada conditions, thus the inequality holds strictly. Further, since rR is
monotonically decreasing, this holds for all yi < y˜. Similarly, assumption 2 ensures ∃yi > y˜.
In this case the inequality can never hold: thus optimal tax rates are declining after this
point. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, note that preferences over τ are single peaked, since U(·) is strictly concave.
Then for a given electorate we can apply the standard Median Voter Theorem. (Note that
the median voter here is not necessarily equivalent to the voter with the median income).
From Proposition 1, we know that τ ∗i reaches a unique maximum at yi = y˜, and the optimal
tax rate is decreasing in yi for yi > y˜.
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Define τ 0 as the median tax rate under E0, and τ
m
i as the median optimal tax rate when
i is the poorest enfranchised citizen. Order the voters in order of income. That is voter i+ 1
is the next richest voter after voter i. For all citizens {i|yi ≥ y˜, i 6= E0}, τ ∗i > τ ∗i+1 ≥ τ 0.
Thus as each of these citizens are enfranchised τm (weakly) increases. Further, this increase
is strict at some point since |{i|yi < y˜, i 6= E0}| ≥ 2. By proposition 1, the optimal tax rate
is increasing in yi for yi < y˜. Then all citizens {i|yi < y˜}, τ ∗i > τ ∗i−1. As a result, if the
median tax rate decreases as the franchise is increased, it will always decrease for further
extensions.
Now suppose τm never decreases as the electorate increased. Then τmi ≥ τ˜ ∀i with
yi < y˜. But this is not the case, since by assumption there are at least two citizens for which
τ ∗i < τ˜ .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider the situation where each voter’s income is a constant share, αi, of average
income y¯. Then the first-order conditions become:
−αiy¯u′((1− τ ∗i )αiy¯) + y¯v′(τ ∗i y¯) = 0 (3.3)
First I show that spending per capita increases with y¯. Note that we can divide through
both sides by y¯. Then suppose otherwise, which implies a reduction in τ ∗i . Since u
′′, v′′ < 0,
then this implies that both terms increase, which is a contradiction. Since this is true ∀i,
then the median level of spending will also increase.
To identify the relationship with τ ∗i , we can use implicit differentiation of the first-order
conditions. This identifies that:
∂τ ∗i
∂y¯
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ τi ≥ α
2
iu
′′((1− τ ∗i )αiy¯)
α2iu
′′((1− τ ∗i )αiy¯) + v′′(τ ∗i y¯)
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Note that this expression is less than 1 and positive (since both the numerator and
denominator are negative). Thus in general, this relationship will depend on the level of
income of the individual αi, and the relative levels of (u
′′, v′′). Thus the outcome on the
optimal tax rate will vary dependent for each individual, and the implemented tax rate will
depend on the identity of the median voter (which may also change with a change in y¯).
However, as v′′(·) approaches −∞, the expression will tend towards 0, and hence always
hold.
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3.D Poverty and expenditure amongst the urban pop-
ulace 1860-1900
How poor were the poor during this period? Answering this question is complicated, since
it relies on understanding not only average incomes—a challenging enough task—but also
the income distribution. Further, the extent of living standards will depend also on the
composition of households since many living costs, such as rent or fuel, are a fixed cost for
the household. These are significant challenges, and I do not aim to address them fully in this
article. However, we can use existing data to make some crude generalizations that provide
some insight into the composition of the urban electorates that are the focus of this study.
I undertake this task in two steps. First, I use Rowntree’s well-known 1901 survey of York
to identify the financial constraints faced by households at different levels of income—i.e.,
how much income was needed to escape poverty? This survey provides very basic estimates
of the poverty line, which we then back-cast to estimate the proportion of the population
living in different levels of poverty in earlier years.
This analysis provides very crude estimates of the proportion of the population in poverty,
but it does not provides any detail as to what the poor spent their income or, how this
changed as they became richer. This is important for our analysis since it is these trade-offs
that the poor faced when voting for or against taxes. To address this issue I analyze budget
data collected by the United States Commissioner of Labor to estimate income elasticities
of demand for different categories of expenditure.
3.D.1 The extent of poverty
To identify the level of income associated with poverty, I use Rowntree (1901)’s detailed 1901
survey of York households. This survey estimates the income of all households in the city of
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York in 1899.26 Based on qualitative reports of investigators, Rowntree estimates that 28%
of the entire population of the city were in living in poverty—defined as displaying existence
of “obvious want or squalor”—at this time (p117). Approximately 10-13% of the population
were estimated as living at a level of poverty below “the minimum expenditure necessary for
the maintenance of physical efficiency”, with the remainder explained as being poor due to
“improvident expenditure” (particularly alcohol).27
Rowntree’s analysis suggests that individuals earning below 18 shillings per week were
living in “chronic want”, and those living at an income between 18 and 21 shillings per
week were living hand to mouth, with any extraordinary expenditure requiring cutting back
on food. These calculations are based on detailed calculations based on household size,
adjusting for the fact that poverty depends on both total income and the composition of the
household—including both household size and the number of children in the household.28
Ideally we would use this detailed analysis of the composition of households when assess-
ing the overall distribution of poverty over time. Unfortunately, Rowntree does not explain
exactly how his level of “primary poverty” is distributed across household income groups.
As such, I make the simple assumption that the 10% (28%) of population he classifies as
being in primary (secondary) poverty relate to the lowest income households unadjusted for
household size or composition.
Using this assumption, we can estimate the proportion of households in poverty by using
Rowntree’s income categories. In particular we use the following three categories:
• 20 shillings per week: corresponding approximately to the proportion in “primary
26This is one of the best known sources of information regarding the extent of poverty in the period. For
further discussion of other sources see Gazeley and Newell (2007). There are some differences between the
methods used to estimate poverty in these different sources, particularly over adjustments for household size.
Given the crude estimates used here these differences are not likely to be very important.
27Gazeley and Newell (2000) re-analyze Rowntree’s figures using a different adjustment for household size
and argue that the correct figure is approximately 6%. However, this does not qualify the general conclusions
relating to the number of households whose fluctuations in income led to changes in food consumption; or
the total perception of the population living in poverty.
28See Gazeley and Newell (2000) for a detailed critique of Rowntree’s methodology.
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poverty”;
• 25 shillings per week: Rowntree’s identifies that moderate-sized families in this income
category often lived in poverty; and
• 28 shillings per week: corresponding to the estimated income threshold beneath which
households were in “secondary” poverty.
Specifically, the proportion of households within each category is calculated by adjusting
the percentage of working class households into a percentage of population using a fixed
ratio, and assuming that households were uniformly distributed within income categories.
The former assumption implies that household size was fixed across groups. This is clearly
inaccurate, but is difficult to adjust for accurately due to data constraints. However, using
simple adjustments to take this into account led to similar results.
Having identified these thresholds, I “back-cast” the proportion of households beneath
these thresholds in 1860 and 1880, using figures from MacKenzie (1921). MacKenzie pro-
vides estimates of the proportion average family income at the 10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles of the income distribution for the years 1860, 1880 and 1914; based on adjust-
ments from figures of A.L. Bowley—a source often used by modern economic historians.29
I adjust these figures into 1899 constant values using the wage series of Crafts and Mills
(1994), and adjust for the proportion of agricultural laborers in the labor force (based on
the original article). The resulting proportions are shown in the table below.
The first point of interest is that the figures from Rowntree correspond relatively closely
to the figures from 1914.30 This likely reflects the fact that first, there was relatively little
real wage growth between 1899 and 1914 (the Crafts and Mills series estimates growth of
29Reflecting this fact, the average growth rates in the median income were close to the average growth
rates in the Crafts and Mills (1994) wage series. This provides further reassurance that we are accurately
capturing the growth in income.
30I have also estimated figures for 1899 directly by interpolating between 1880 and 1914, but the results
were very similar to the 1914 figures, so for simplicity I use the MacKenzie figures.
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Table 3.4: Estimated proportion of urban households in different income
groups 1860-1900
% of households 1860 1880 1914 Rowntree
(1901)
Income < 20s 39% 16% 5% 10%
Income < 25s 62% 40% 18% 19%
Income < 28s 76% 56% 27% 28%
Source: Income figures refer to weekly income, and are in real terms. Estimates based on author’s calcu-
lations based on information from Rowntree (1901); MacKenzie (1921); Crafts and Mills (1994). See text
for details of methodology.
around 3% over this period) and second that York was a relatively prosperous town (Gazeley
and Newell, 2007). This comparability provides some confidence that MacKenzie’s estimates
are accurately capturing the income distribution of urban households.
The results suggest that a large proportion of households faced significant financial con-
straints during the period of study. In 1860—near the beginning of our period—almost 40%
of urban households are estimated to have been living “hand to mouth”. By 1880 the pro-
portion of the population facing these constraints had fallen considerably; but between 40%
and 56% of households nevertheless earned incomes that were associated with Rowntree’s
secondary poverty.
3.D.2 Spending of the poor
What did the poor spend their money on? Rowntree provides evidence that for the very
poorest category rent was a major expense; accounting for almost 30% of income on average.
This proportion fell dramatically as income increased however, accounting for 19% for those
with income between 18 and 20 shillings per week, 17% for those between 20 and 25 shillings
per week, and 16% for those earning between 25 and 30 shillings per week.31 Further, he
indicates that even the poorest paid rates (largely through their landlord), with the combined
31The corresponding figures for higher income households were: 31s-40s: 14%; 41-50s: 12%; 51-60s:12%
and over 60s: 9%.
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total of rents and rates accounting for approximately 20% of income.
Rowntree’s evidence is less thorough, however, in estimating other types of expenditure—
such as food—since he collected detailed budget data for just 18 households. Instead, we
investigate the effect of changes in income on the composition of household expenditure using
data from 1889 and 1890 surveys of the United States Commissioner of Labor (USCL).32
These surveys provide detailed information on the income and expenditure of 1,024 British
families headed by industrial workers. These families are not a representative sample since
they were chosen on the basis of industry (including woolen and cotton textiles, pig iron, bar
iron and steel making, coke and glass manufacture, and coal mining).33 As a result, while
the average incomes appear representative of their industries, the average earnings appear
much higher than the population as a whole and are “not generally representative of the
laboring poor” (Horrell and Oxley, 1999, p. 499). Nevertheless, we can use the budgets to
estimate the changes in composition of income at least amongst this class of citizens. A
further advantage of using the USCL data is that we can adjust for household size allowing
us to assess the poorest citizens more accurately. In particular, we can identify the poverty
line—the minimum level of income required to maintain physical efficiency—adjusted for the
composition of the household, and then assess how close households are to that poverty line.
To identify the poverty line we use the estimated equivalence ratios calculated by Gazeley
and Newell (2000). These estimates identify the minimum income needed for a childless
couple, and then identify the multiple of that income needed to maintain a family with
different numbers of children—up to families with 6 children. We exclude families with more
than two adults or more than 6 children from the analysis, reducing the sample from 1,024
to 921 (all families had at least two adults).
The results for this analysis indicate that only 8 families in the sample fall beneath this
32The data were obtained from the IPCSR (Haines, 2006).
33For more discussion of the representativeness of the sample, see Horrell and Oxley (1999).
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poverty line, reflecting the bias in sample discussed above. As such we cannot identify the
budgets of the very poorest individuals. However, we can identify groups of workers relatively
close to this poverty line. In particular, we use three definitions of poverty: those with an
income of 1.25 times the poverty line, 1.5 times the poverty line, and 2 times the poverty line.
The 1.5 times group relates most closely to Rowntree’s definition, if we consider a household
income of around 18-20 shillings as defining primary poverty and an income of around 25-30
shillings as defining secondary poverty.
We will shortly use the data to estimate income elasticities of demand for different expen-
diture categories. However, as a preliminary step Table 1 displays the raw share of income
spent on different expenditure categories for these three groups. Note that the first group
is relatively small (including only 50 households), meaning that we should be careful about
the conclusions we draw. In addition, the table also displays the proportion of households
spending more than their income. A significant proportion of households were spending more
than their income—almost 20% in the most generous poverty definition.
Food expenditure is split into “basic” and “non-basic” categories. Basic foods include
butter, bread, condiments, flour, lard, potatoes, rice, tea and other foods. Non-basic foods
include meat, poultry, pork, fish, fruit, vegetables, cheese, eggs, coffee, sugar, molasses and
milk. We can see that the share of food in expenditure falls across the three categories, but
the share of these non-basic foods increases slightly. A further point of interest is that even
households in the poorest group spent money on both amusements (including reading), liquor
and tobacco. At first glance one might think that this discretionary expenditure means that
the household is not that poor. However, both contemporary and current evidence suggests
that this kind of expenditure is common even amongst the very poorest. Rowntree (1901)
argues that much of the secondary poverty he identifies is due to expenditure on alcohol—
and that this is was itself an “outcome of the adverse conditions under which many of the
working classes live” (p144). A recent modern study shows that those earning less than $1
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per day—the modern poverty line—frequently spend a significant proportion of their budget
on alcohol, tobacco and festivals even at the expense of more calories (Banerjee and Duflo,
2007).
Table 3.5: Household budgets for different income groups
Income ≤ 1.25x
poverty line
Income ≤ 1.5x
poverty line
Income ≤ 2x
poverty line
Share of income
Food-basics 30% 27% 25%
Food-non-basics 23% 24% 25%
Food-total 53% 51% 50%
Rent 15% 14% 13%
Clothing 14% 15% 15%
Lighting / fuel 9% 8% 7%
Amusements / vacations 1% 2% 3%
Liquor and tobacco 4% 4% 4%
Other 6% 6% 7%
Savings -1% 0% 2%
Proportion borrowing 34% 26% 19%
N 50 163 447
Basic foods include butter, bread, condiments, flour, lard, potatoes, rice, tea and other foods. Non-
basic foods include meat, poultry, pork, fish, fruit, vegetables, cheese, eggs, coffee, sugar, molasses
and milk. Clothing is the aggregate of clothing for husband, wife and children. Amusements / va-
cations includes reading expenditure. Other includes contributions to labor, religious, charitable
and other organizations, taxes (except property taxes), property insurance, life insurance, sickness
insurance, furniture and other expenditure.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from 1889 and 1890 surveys of the USCL.
To understand the effect of increasing income more formally, we undertake a simple
regression analysis. Using regressions allows us to use the variation in income within the
broad categories discussed above, and also adjust for differences in household composition.
Adjusting for the make-up of the household is important since the food needs of a household
will depend on the number (and age of children) in the household, as well as the occupation
of household members. Those working in heavy industry, for instance, will have greater food
requirements. Further, these variables will also be correlated with income per household
member since how many individuals are working and the industry of employment will both
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affect the total income of the household.
We estimate the income elasticity of demand for this group on a number of expenditure
items, using the following specification:
ln(ei/Ni) = β0 + β1ln(incomei/Ni) + γXi + i
where i indexes households and j indexes an expenditure category (e.g., food). The
variable ei thus identifies the spending of household i on category j. The variable income
represents the total household income, and Ni is the total size of household i. Since both
the independent and dependent variables are in logs, the coefficient β1 in this specification
represents the income elasticity of demand for the good j.
The vector X contains a number of characteristics of the composition of the household—
the number of children split by age categories (0-4, 5-9, 10-15, and over 15), the number
of working children, whether the wife works and eight dummy variables for industry of
employment: pig iron, bar iron, steel, coal, coke, cottons, woolens, and glass.
In addition to calculating the income elasticities, we carry out a similar analysis to identify
the effect of increased income on the probability of borrowing during the period. The probit
specification we use is:
borrowi = β0 + β1ln(incomei/Ni) + γXi + i
Where borrowi is a binary variable taking the value 1 if a household spent more than their
income, and zero otherwise.
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 2. Each cell represents the estimate
of β1 from the regression specification above, along with the estimated standard error. The
first eight rows refer to the income elasticity specifications, where the dependent variable is
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log expenditure on each of the expenditure categories.34
Table 3.6: Estimated income elasticities of demand by expenditure category for
different income groups
Income ≤ 1.25x
poverty line
Income ≤ 1.5x
poverty line
Income ≤ 2x
poverty line
Income elasticity
Food-basics -0.27 0.39* 0.46***
(0.54) (0.20) (0.08)
Food-non-basics 1.77*** 1.31*** 1.03***
(0.42) (0.17) (0.07)
Food-total 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.76***
(0.27) (0.11) (0.05)
Rent 1.99*** 1.04*** 0.58***
(0.45) (0.21) (0.08)
Clothing 0.50 1.14*** 0.87***
(0.62) (0.26) (0.11)
Lighting / fuel 0.53 0.40* 0.08
(0.97) (0.22) (0.09)
Leisure 0.91 1.70** 1.21***
(2.32) (0.64) (0.29)
Other 2.18 1.88*** 1.75***
(1.33) (0.52) (0.22)
Change in probability of borrowing 1.73** -0.19 -0.25***
(0.92) (0.30) (0.11)
N 50 163 431
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Income elasticities based on regressions of log expenditure on log income
per household member, with control variables of: number of children in age categories 0 to 4; 5 to 9; 10 to 15;
and over 15, number of children working, whether wife working, and dummy variables for industries pig iron,
bar iron, steel, coal, coke, cottons, woolens, and glass. “Change in probability of debt” represents the marginal
effect of log income per household member on a binary variable identifying whether the household spent more
than income, measured at the means of all control variables. Some regressions have fewer observations than the
total in the group, due to zero expenditures on that category by some households.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The results indicate that in the poorest group additional expenditure led to large increases
in the share of expenditure spent on higher quality food and on rent. Noticeably, the income
elasticity of food as a whole is close to one—suggesting that these individuals may have been
sufficiently poor that Engels’ Law did not apply.
34There are fewer categories here than in the previous table. This is because we group some categories to
overcome expenditures of zero on certain items.
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Expanding the sample to include wealthier households (column 2) shows a similar pattern,
with high income associated with a shift towards non-basic food items. However, rent now
appears to increase proportionally with income, as does clothing. Both leisure and the other
category are now classed as luxury goods—the latter category is driven in large part by
furniture spending. Once households with income per family member of up to two times
the poverty line, the income elasticity of both rent and non-basic food falls significantly.
However, there is now evidence that an increase in income is associated with a decrease in
the probability that individuals are relying on debt to fuel their expenditure.
In summary, this analysis suggests that at very low levels of income, individuals used
added income to increase their spending on rent and to switch to higher quality foods,
including meat, vegetables and fruit. As income increased further, individuals continued to
increase the share of their spending on quality food, but were also able to purchase more
leisure goods, such as liquor and tobacco. As income increased even further, the share of
expenditure on both rent and good declined, with income instead being directed further
towards these more discretionary goods, and also a reduction in borrowing.
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3.E Additional regression results
Table 3.7 presents the results of regressions of the franchise against key dependent variables,
in four cross sections: pre-reform (1866), immediately post-reform (1873), 12 years after the
reforms (1885) and the end of the study period (1897). The top panel shows the relationship
between the franchise and the three major time-varying observable characteristics: popula-
tion, urban crowding, population growth, as well as a dummy variable indicating that the
town was incorporated in 1835. In the bottom panel, the residuals from these regressions are
regressed on other observable characteristics that could plausibly be correlated with the level
of government expenditure on public goods. These include the level of population density
in 1871, the value of the tax base per capita, and dummy variables identifying whether the
town had a significant proportion of farmers (more than 10% of the population) or textile
workers (more than 5% of the population) in 1881.35 For the 1885 and 1897 cross sections,
the measure of the tax base per capita reflects the three year moving average of the tax base
per capita. For the 1866 and 1873 cross sections the measure relates to the three year average
in 1875 (that is, including the 1874, 1875 and 1876 levels) since this is the first year that
a relatively stable value of the tax base, and hence a better proxy for wealth, is available.
None of the independent variables in the second panel are statistically significant, suggesting
that the remaining variation in the franchise is idiosyncratic.
Table 3.8 presents the results of the panel regressions including one and two lags in
the dependent variable. The signs of the franchise coefficients have the correct signs and
are statistically significant in all four specifications. Table 3.9 shows that the inverted-
U-relationship holds when the sample is restricted to the three periods 1868, 1876, and
1882—the period near the 1869 reforms to the franchise. Again the inverted-U-relationship
35Measures of the proportion of farmers or textile workers were constructed from the 100% sample of the
1881 census, discussed above.
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is strongly supported in these regressions.
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Table 3.7: Variation in the franchise is idiosyncratic after controlling for urban
crowding, population growth and incorporation year.
1866 1873 1885 1897
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV=Franchise (% Adult male population)
Population growth -84.51 -4.62 23.34 -240.37***
(68.13) (65.42) (86.46) (85.99)
Urban crowding -6.17*** -6.26*** -5.14*** -4.37***
(0.93) (0.79) (0.93) (1.21)
Popn 10k-25k -3.68* -2.53 -3.00* -2.15
(2.07) (1.72) (1.80) (1.52)
Popn 25k-50k 1.01 1.75 -2.94 -2.91
(2.69) (1.93) (1.81) (1.82)
Popn 50k-100k -9.40*** 3.67 0.85 -3.07
(3.16) (2.38) (2.13) (2.23)
Popn 100k-250k 2.29 4.26 0.19 -2.31
(4.79) (2.88) (2.53) (2.02)
Popn >250k -19.14*** 3.99 -3.98 -5.88**
(2.80) (2.89) (3.15) (2.93)
Incorporated 1835 -3.28 -3.90** -1.43 -1.53
(2.13) (1.58) (1.72) (1.38)
No. obs 144 145 145 148
Adj. R-sq 0.37 0.38 0.25 0.36
F-stat 18.34 12.64 7.38 7.37
F-test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DV=Residuals from franchise regression
farmingTownDummy 0.42 0.42 0.77 -0.10
(1.94) (1.68) (1.73) (1.44)
> 5% textiles -0.57 0.71 -1.27 0.79
(2.30) (1.43) (1.40) (1.35)
1871 popn density -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Tax base per capita 0.78 -1.10 -1.02 -0.52
(1.01) (0.90) (0.62) (0.54)
No. obs 139 139 139 141
Adj. R-sq -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
F-stat 0.26 0.42 1.26 0.72
F-test (p-val) 0.90 0.80 0.29 0.58
Dependent variable in bottom panel is the residuals from the regression in respective column
in panel 1. Once population, population growth, urban crowding and whether incorporated in
1835 are controlled for, none of the remaining observable characteristics of towns predicts the
level of the franchise.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Inverted-U-relationship supported in tests for serial correlation.
Tax receipts p.c. Public goods spend p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male franchise 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.15**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Male franchise sq -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02** -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag 1 tax p.c. 0.72*** 0.58***
(0.02) (0.02)
Lag 2 tax p.c. 0.20***
(0.02)
Lag 1 spend p.c. 0.67*** 0.61***
(0.02) (0.02)
Lag 2 spend p.c. 0.10***
(0.02)
No. obs 4550 4533 4550 4533
No. towns 150 150 150 150
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Town Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Popn. controls Y Y Y Y
Franchise turning point (%) 45 44 54 54
F-test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05
U-test (p-val) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
See notes to Table 3.1. Note that the number of observations is reduced in comparison to Table 3.1 due
to the inclusion of the lagged terms.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.9: Inverted-U-relationship is also supported during period near
reforms.
Tax receipts p.c. Public goods spend p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male franchise 0.33** 0.34** 0.46** 0.54***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19)
Male franchise sq -0.03** -0.03** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No. obs 418 418 418 418
No. towns 145 145 145 145
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Town Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Popn. controls N Y N Y
Franchise turning point (%) 50 52 51 50
F-test (p-val) 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.02
U-test (p-val) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
See notes to Table 3.1. Regression restricted to years 1868, 1876 and 1882.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 4
Local government sanitation expendi-
ture and the decline in mortality from
waterborne disease
4.1 Introduction
Between 1851 and 1900 mortality rates in Britain declined by almost 20%. Over the same
period, local government expenditure on sanitation infrastructure increased rapidly, so that
by 1890 spending by local authorities accounted for over 41% of total public expenditure
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2004), with much of the money used for clean water and sewers. This
simple pattern leads to the natural conclusion that government sanitation expenditure was
the driving force to the improvement in life expectancy. However, the importance of sanita-
tion investment remains a matter of debate, and there is disagreement about the extent and
effectiveness of sanitary investment during this period (see, in particular, Williamson, 2002;
Szreter, 2005).
The rapid urbanization accompanying the Industrial Revolution overwhelmed existing
sanitary infrastructure and caused urban living environments to deteriorate (Szreter, 2005),
creating challenges similar to those faced in developing countries today (Gu¨nther and Fink,
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2011). To deal with these problems, municipal governments had to increase local govern-
ment expenditure to unprecedented levels, but that created financial difficulties and sparked
taxpayer opposition (Hennock, 1963; Wohl, 1983). To understand the opposition, we must
identify whether the spending that did occur was beneficial. Evidence from other coun-
tries (e.g., Cain and Rotella, 2001; Troesken, 2002) has shown that investment in sanitary
infrastructure, such as clean water supply, can have positive effects on mortality. But no
comprehensive empirical evidence has been brought to the question for England.
This paper assesses the effectiveness of local investment in sanitary public goods in re-
ducing waterborne diseases using a new panel dataset for England and Wales between 1871
and 1890. This dataset combines information on town-level expenditure on public goods
with information on local mortality rates from waterborne diseases. In particular, the anal-
ysis uses information on local public goods controlled by the “urban sanitary authorities”
tasked with improving sanitary environments after 1872. During this period decisions over
investment in public goods were made by local town councils, leading to great variation in
the extent of investment across the country which can be exploited for empirical analysis.
The core specifications estimate the effect of urban sanitation expenditure on mortality
rates from cholera and diarrhea in the registration districts for which mortality rates were
reported. The main specifications are estimated using two-period fixed effects regressions,
where the two cross sections are the decades 1871–1880 and 1881–1890. By including district
and year fixed effects I am able to control for time-invariant district-specific factors and time
trends, and hence identify the effect of sanitary expenditure.
The results show that government spending on sanitary public goods—including water
supply, sewer systems, and cleaning and paving of streets—had economically and statistically
significant effects on mortality rates from cholera and diarrhea. A one standard deviation
increase in sanitary expenditure is estimated to have led to a decline of between 0.1 and 0.20
standard deviations in the mortality rate from these diseases during the period. The size of
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this estimate implies that sanitary expenditure accounted for between 18% and 41% of the
reduction in mortality from these waterborne diseases at all ages across the whole period.
I undertake a number of checks to ensure that the relationship is causal. First, I include
control variables measuring the tax base per capita and the level of expenditure on gas
per capita. These variables act as proxies for the wealth of the district to account for
the fact that, for instance, wealthier areas may have had higher expenditure on public
goods and also engaged in behavioral change that reduced mortality. Second, I carry out a
number of placebo tests on other diseases that we would not expect to be directly affected
by sanitation expenditure, including tuberculosis—a central part of the overall reduction in
mortality over this time period. As expected, there is little evidence of a negative relationship
between sanitation expenditure and these other diseases. Finally, I control for mortality
trends in the rural areas surrounding each urban district to account for other local factors
affecting mortality that may erroneously be attributed to greater sanitation expenditure in
our regressions. The estimated effect of the sanitation expenditure is robust to this test and
remains large and statistically significant.
Beyond their direct historical significance, these findings also have important implications
for wider debates about democratic reform in the nineteenth-century. In Chapter 3 I have
argued that both the poor and the rich opposed expenditure on public goods in this period
due to the high financial cost of infrastructure investment. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) have
argued that the local franchise was extended in England in order to prevent pork barrel
spending and achieve greater government expenditure on key public goods. Both stories
rely on the assumption that public goods expenditure was (or at least was expected to be)
effective—rather than being wasted through incompetence or corruption. My results in this
paper provide evidence that this assumption is justified, and thus that the extension of the
franchise had a big impact not just on the level of government expenditure but also on
important economic outcomes.
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4.2 Background
Britain became a much healthier place in the second half of the nineteenth century, with
crude total mortality rates falling from 22 to 18 per 1,000 living between 1851 and 1900.
Deaths from waterborne diseases fell at an even faster rate, as shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Mortality from waterborne diseases fell by over 30% between 1870
and 1900, faster than the 20% decline in total mortality rates.
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Source: Decennial Reports of the Registrar General 1851–1900.
This overall mortality decline, however, masks significant variation in the experience
across different localities. As shown in Figure 4.2, while life expectancy increased across
all major cities during the second half of the century, the extent of the increase differed
considerably across different towns. This is illustrated by the two towns highlighted in the
Figure: Nottingham (NOT) and Sunderland (SUN). Whereas Nottingham was one of the
least healthy towns in the decade 1851–1860, by the end of the century it was ranked in the
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top third of these large towns for life expectancy. Sunderland, in contrast, was relatively
healthy at the beginning of the period but was in the bottom third by the end of the century.
Figure 4.2: General increase in life expectancy across English cities, but with
significant variation in experiences between towns.
Source: Szreter (2005). NOT=Nottingham; SUN=Sunderland.
The question for this paper is the extent to which these differences in mortality between
towns were caused by different levels of sanitation investment. As suggestive evidence, be-
tween 1871 and 1890 Nottingham—where life expectancy rose sharply—spent an average
of £0.45 per capita each year on sanitation public goods, while Sunderland—where life ex-
pectancy stagnated—spent only £0.14 per capita.1 Recent studies from other countries have
shown that government public health interventions did have a large impact on mortality
in the early twentieth-century. Cain and Rotella (2001), for example, estimate that a 1%
increase in sanitation expenditures would have led to close to a 3% decline in the annual
death rate in 48 American cities between 1899 and 1929. Cutler and Miller (2005) find that
clean water technologies had a social rate of return that was 23 to 1 in major US cities in the
1These figures are based on the dataset discussed in detail in Section 4.3.
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early twentieth-century (see also Troesken, 2002; Ferrie and Troesken, 2008; Kesztenbaum
and Rosenthal, 2013). Several studies within the modern development literature also show
significant effects of water improvements and sanitation access on health outcomes, particu-
larly amongst infants (e.g., Zwane and Kremer, 2007; Ahuja et al., 2010; Fink et al., 2011;
Zhang, 2012).
Despite this evidence, the role of public health in explaining British mortality decline in
the nineteenth-century remains disputed. Although mortality rates fell dramatically after
1850, the classic explanation—due to McKeown (1976)—has emphasized the importance of
better nutrition rather than improved sanitary environments. This conclusion followed from
estimates showing that the greatest contribution to the decrease in mortality rates during
this period came from reductions in airborne, rather than waterborne, diseases. However
later work has questioned this conclusion, arguing that it overlooks the potential contribution
of sanitary reform in reducing overcrowding (and hence deaths from airborne diseases) and
does not account for differences in the death rates from different airborne diseases (e.g.,
Woods, 1984; Szreter, 2005). After accounting for the latter factor Szreter (2005) argues
that “the classic sanitation diseases come to the fore” in explaining the mortality decline
after 1850 (p115).
This literature lacks detailed quantitative data regarding the extent of public sanitation
investment during the period. Those studies that do exist either focus on particular case
studies (e.g. Woods, 1984) or use small samples of towns (Millward and Sheard, 1995; Mill-
ward and Bell, 1998). As such, they are unable to identify how many people benefited from
sanitary investments, or whether these investments were associated with mortality improve-
ments on a large scale. This study addresses these issues through constructing and putting
to use a dataset identifying town-level expenditure across England and Wales.
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4.3 Data and empirical specification
The dataset I use for my empirical analysis combines town-level expenditure on public goods
with information on mortality. In this section I first outline the sources from which the data
was collected and then explain the geographical units that are the basis of the empirical
analysis. I then explain the empirical specification and, finally, detail the construction of the
key independent and dependent variables.
4.3.1 Data sources
Mortality data
Information about mortality and causes of death comes from official statistics reported by
the Registrar General for the period 1871–1890. These reports detail nationwide mortality
information disaggregated according to varying levels of administrative geography. The most
basic reporting unit was the registration sub-district, of which there were approximately 2,000
in England and Wales. Each sub-district then formed part of a larger registration district—
which in turn formed part of a registration county and, finally, a registration division.2
This paper uses data at the level of registration sub-district and registration district.
Registration sub-district information was collected from the Quarterly Returns of the Regis-
trar General for the third quarter of each year between 1871 and 1891, with the exception of
the years 1880 and 1882.3 These reports were digitized for the purposes of this project, with
the exception of the years 1871, 1881, and 1891 which were previously digitized by Southall
(1998) and stored at the UK Data Archive. The third quarter was chosen since waterborne
diseases—such as diarrhea—were particularly likely to strike during the summer months.
2There were approximately 600 registration districts, 50 registration counties and 9 registration divisions.
3Reports for these years were unavailable at the time of writing, but they will be collected as part of
ongoing research. In addition, data was missing for some districts in other years as the reports were illegible.
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The Quarterly Reports during this period contain information on the total number of
deaths, and deaths from nine causes: smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, cholera, diarrhea,
violence, whooping cough, diphtheria and fever.4 This list, however, excludes a number of
important causes of death during this period—particularly airborne diseases such as tubercu-
losis. Nor do the quarterly reports disaggregate the cause of death by age group, precluding
us from identifying the effect of sanitary intervention on specific age groups.
However, information on causes of death for different age groups is available at the
level of registration district in a series of decennial reports by the Registrar General5—in
particular, the reports for the decades 1861–1870, 1871–1880 and 1881–1890. Each report
details the average population and number of deaths in each registration district in the
decade, disaggregated by age group (in five or ten year intervals) and cause of death.
One concern with both of these sources is the frequent changes to district boundaries that
occurred over the course of the nineteenth century. This difficulty is mitigated, to an extent,
when using registration district data, since most changes involved reallocations of parishes
between sub-districts within a single registration district—and so there were fewer changes
in registration district boundaries. However, to address the issue fully I adjust the mortality
data for each year to consistent 1881 district boundaries. To do this, I first identified all
sub-district boundary changes between 1871 and 1891 and re-weighted the data to the 1881
district boundaries based on population weight. A fuller explanation of this procedure is
provided in the appendix.
Financial data
Financial data are drawn from the Local Taxation Returns reported to Parliament and col-
lected in the Parliamentary Papers collection. Data was collected for all “urban sanitary
4The category “fever” covered a range of maladies including typhoid (or enteric fever), simple continued
fever and puerperal fever.
5This data was digitized by Woods (1997).
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authorities” for each year from 1872 to 1900.6 This includes approximately 900 towns,
which were all granted standardized expenditure powers under the terms of the 1872 Public
Health Act. The accounts report sanitary expenditure in three categories: “water supply”,
“sewers and sewer systems” and “highways, scavenging and watering”. Financial values
are then translated into constant values using the Rousseaux Price Index (Mitchell, 1971,
pp. 723-4) following Millward and Sheard (1995). Information on sub-district population,
number of houses, and area was collected from census information. Town-level data was
collected directly from census reports for the purposes of this project. Additional census in-
formation was collected from existing datasets collected by Southall (2004)—further details
are provided in the appendix.
4.3.2 Units of analysis
Unfortunately, town boundaries during this period did not match the boundaries of the
registration districts or sub-districts for which mortality data was reported. Registration
districts varied in the number of urban authorities they include: large towns comprised whole
(and sometimes multiple) registration districts, while some registration districts included
multiple smaller sanitary authorities. Given this issue, I link the financial and mortality data
by first linking each town to the registration sub-district(s) in which it was situated using
information reported in the 1881 census, Vol II. Where town boundaries crossed multiple
registration districts, town spending was allocated to each registration district according to
the population residing in each district at the time of the census.
The major unit of the analysis following this linking exercise is the registration district.
This approach has the advantage of matching directly to the mortality information reported
in the Registrar General’s decennial reports—and it is those reports that provide the most
6For 1872 the accounts are reported under the titles of Local Boards of Health and Improvement
Commissions— the bodies which were renamed Urban Sanitary Authorities in the 1872 Public Health Act.
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detailed disaggregation of mortality. The main disadvantage is that registration districts
often included large swathes of rural areas as well as urban districts. This could lead to
a concern that our measure of mortality at the level of the registration district is not cap-
turing the true effects of urban expenditure. To address this issue, we undertake a second
analysis in which we measure only mortality in urban registration sub-districts—that is the
registration sub-districts that contain part of a town. That has two advantages. First, it
allows us to exclude deaths in purely rural areas from our analysis. Second—and even more
importantly—by splitting registration districts into their urban and rural components, it
allows us to control for shocks or trends that affect the whole district, but that have nothing
to do with sanitary investment, such as a general behavioral change, or a reduction in the
virulence of a disease in the district due to weather fluctuations. By controlling for such
shocks or trends, we will capture the true effect of sanitary expenditure and not something
extraneous.
4.3.3 Empirical specification
The data is used to construct a two-period panel dataset, where each cross section relates to
a decade reported in the annual reports of the Registrar General: 1871–1880 and 1881–1890.
I then estimate the effect of sanitary expenditure on deaths using the following specification:
death ratei,t = α + βspendpci,t + γXi,t + δ0Zi + δ1year + i,t
where i indexes registration districts and t = 1, 2 indexes each decade. The variable
death rate measures the number of deaths per capita from waterborne diseases, and spendpc
is the level of urban sanitary expenditure per capita. (Details of the construction of these
two variables are provided in the following subsection.) X is a vector of control variables,
Zi includes district fixed effects, year is a decade fixed effect, and  is an error term. The
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basic set of control variables includes district population, urban population, percentage pop-
ulation urban, 10-year district population growth, population density, and urban crowding
(measured as number of people / number of houses). In addition, I include death rate from
violence as a measure of urbanization, and the percentage of population aged under 5 as a
measure of the population most vulnerable to the diseases under study.
In interpreting the results, one concern could be that the coefficient on sanitary spending
is capturing the effect of other correlated urban variables. In particular, we might think
that higher sanitary spending is associated with greater town wealth, with other government
spending that may improve the urban environment in different ways, and possibly with
greater public awareness leading to behavior change such as more hand-washing.7
I control for this in two ways. First, I include additional control variables for urban tax
base per capita and urban per capita expenditure on gas supply. As a second test that I am
identifying a causal relationship, I undertake a series of placebo tests using deaths from other
diseases that should be unaffected by sanitary investment. When analyzing the sub-district
level data, the dependent variable for this placebo test is the combined death rate from the
other diseases specified in the Quarterly Reports: smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, whooping
cough, and diphtheria, with the exception of the category “fever” (which includes deaths from
typhoid which was potentially affected by sanitation). In the registration district analysis,
the dependent variable is the mortality rate from pulmonary tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is
particularly interesting, since it was a major health risk during this period, with a crude
death rate almost three times that from cholera and diarrhea. However, since it is not
waterborne, we would not expect the sanitary investments studied here to have any effect
on the number of tuberculosis deaths.
7For example, see Troesken (1999) for a discussion of the “hand-washing” effect on typhoid deaths.
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4.3.4 Definition of key variables
Mortality data
The key dependent variables in the analysis are crude mortality rates according to various
causes of death and at different ages. The main focus of the analysis is on deaths from
waterborne diseases—in particular, deaths from cholera, diarrhea and dysentery. Ideally,
deaths from typhoid would also be included in this measure. Unfortunately, that is not
possible because deaths from typhoid were not clearly distinguished in the dicennial reports
of the Registrar General from those from typhus until 1871, and even after 1871 there were
considerable reporting inaccuracies, with typhoid often incorrectly diagnosed as either typhus
or continued fever.8
Because each cross section in our panel covers a decade, the appropriate measure is the
average death rate over the decade:
death rate ageI =
Number of deaths at ageI
(Average population at ageI/ 100,000)
When analyzing the entire registration district we can use the information directly from
the Registrar’s Decennial reports, which provide average mortality information across each
decade. Mortality data for deaths in registration sub-districts, on the other hand, is reported
by year (precisely, the third quarter in each year). For the numerator of the measure we
use the average the number of deaths in the sub-district across the years for which data is
available.9
The Decennial registration district reports also report average district population across
the decade. Average populations are not available for the registration sub-districts, so I
8For discussion of these problems, see The Lancet, September 21, 1878 and Supplement to the Fifty-Fifth
Report of the Annual Report of the Registrar-General, p. xxvii.
9As discussed above, data was missing for all districts for 1880 and 1882, and some data was missing for
some districts for other years due to illegible reports.
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estimate an average population by assuming that sub-district population grew at an com-
pound average growth rate between decennial censuses and interpolating. The average of
this interpolated population then serves as the denominator of the measure.
4.3.5 Measuring sanitary expenditure
Financial data
The key independent variable used in the analysis is the level of “sanitary expenditure” per
capita. This measure aggregates spending on “water supply”, “sewers and sewerage”, and
“highways, scavenging and watering”. The last category of spending is included because it
paid for street cleaning and emptying of privy middens, as well as paving.10
To estimate the effect of sanitary expenditure it is important to differentiate between
investment and ongoing expenditure for maintenance—all the more so since investment ex-
penditure often involves large up-front costs. Failing to account for this fact could lead to
the erroneous conclusion that expenditure is falling over time, as would happen, for instance,
if a town built a sewer system in year 1 and then only carried out maintenance expenditure
thereafter.11
Unfortunately, the annual reports do not separate ongoing and investment expenditure
for most of the study period. To separate ongoing expenditure from investment expenditure,
I first identify “investment periods” by analyzing deviations in trend expenditure for each
type of expenditure. Investment periods are identified using both the level and year-on-year
increase in expenditure.12 An investment period is identified as starting when either a town
begins spending for the first time, when year-on-year expenditure increases by more than
100%, or if the town’s per capita expenditure is higher than twice the median of per capita
10These categories are those identified as having a sanitary aspect in Millward and Sheard (1995).
11The fact that we are estimating the effects across a decade mitigates this concern to a large degree;
however it is important consideration when thinking about the benefits of public good investment.
12See the Appendix for more detail on the identification of these investment periods.
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expenditure in the town in the following ten years. An investment period is then identified
as continuing until expenditure falls significantly again, relatively both to other towns and
future expenditure in the same town.
I then took the increased expenditure from the investment period and spread it over the
following twenty-five-year period, to reflect the estimated life-time of the debt generally used
to finance investments. Total sanitary expenditure in year t is then measured as:
sanitary expendt = ongoing expendt +
t∑
s=t−25
investment spends
25
Here the level of ongoing expenditure in non-investment periods is simply the expendi-
ture in that period. In investment periods, the level of ongoing expenditure is the level of
expenditure in the next non-investment period. For instance, if 1873 and 1874 were invest-
ment periods, but 1875 was not, then the level of ongoing expenditure in 1873 and 1874 is
set equal to that in 1875. Investment expenditure in period t is equal to the actual level of
expenditure minus the level of ongoing expenditure in that period.
Our key measure of sanitary expenditure is per capita sanitary expenditure in each regis-
tration district. We use the per capita measure since many of these local public goods—e.g.,
water supply—suffer from important congestion effects (in other words they are very impure
public goods in the theoretical sense). Our independent variable of interest is then:
spendpct =
Average sanitary expend
Average decadal population
where Average sanitary expend averages annual expenditures for each town within the
district across the decade.13 The measure of the Average decadal population is then the
same as in the calculation of the mortality rates.
13Generally this involves 9 periods in the first decade and 10 periods in the second decade since disaggre-
gated expenditure data is not available before 1872. Some towns have missing data for other periods, mainly
because they only started reporting to Parliament after 1872 (smaller towns in particular).
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Aggregate effect of expenditure by age group and cause
We begin our analysis by using data at the level of entire registration districts. The registra-
tion district data allows us to estimate the full magnitude of the effect of sanitary expenditure
between 1871 and 1890, and also to determine which age groups benefited most from sani-
tary investment. We will then confirm these results by using nearby rural areas as a control
group for urban areas.
Table 4.1 displays the estimated effects of sanitary expenditure on mortality rates for
those aged under 5 (the group likely to be most at risk) in columns (1) to (4) and for all age
groups in columns (5) to (8). The coefficients are standardized: they should be interpreted
as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable in terms of
standard deviations of the dependent variable. Specifications (1) and (5) include sanitary
expenditure as the only independent variable (other than the fixed effects), while (2) and
(6) include both the basic control variables and the measures of town gas expenditure and
tax base per capita. Specifications (3) and (7) include the lagged value of the dependent
variable. Finally, specifications (4) and (8) include county-level time trends.
The results show consistent and strong evidence that sanitary expenditure reduced water-
borne mortality rates across all specifications. The strength of the results for children under
5 is particularly reassuring, since it would be surprising if sanitary expenditure reduced wa-
terborne mortality without affecting this group. There is, as expected, little evidence of a
significant effect on deaths from tuberculosis in the placebo tests (see the bottom panel),
providing assurance that we are capturing a causal effect of sanitary expenditure on mor-
tality. Although there are negative coefficients that are statistically significant at the 10%
level in the tuberculosis regression specifications (1) and (5), they disappear once we include
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the control variables, suggesting that the significance could reflect a wealth or a district
size effect. Interestingly, however, there is some evidence that our proxies for wealth (tax
base per capita and gas per capita) were associated with large declines in deaths from both
tuberculosis and waterborne diseases.
Table 4.1: Effect of sanitary spending on death rates 1871–1890
DV=Mortality rate under 5 DV=Mortality rate all ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cholera and diarrhea
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.11** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.11**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Tax base p.c. -0.11 -0.11 -0.21** -0.09 -0.09 -0.20**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Gas spend p.c. -0.09* -0.08* -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Lag U5 waterborne mortality -0.09 -0.14**
(0.06) (0.05)
Lag waterborne mortality -0.08* -0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Pulmonary tuberculosis
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.12* -0.08 -0.13 -0.07 -0.06* 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Tax base p.c. -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14** -0.14** -0.11
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Gas spend p.c. -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Lag Under5 TB mortality -0.34*** -0.35***
(0.07) (0.06)
Lag TB mortality 0.05 -0.08
(0.05) (0.06)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
County time trends N N N Y N N N Y
Obs. 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830
No. Districts 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415
Full results are presented in the appendix in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by district, and are dis-
played in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.2 presents the results from estimating specifications (2) and (3) above on four
different age groups including, for comparison, the group aged under 5 reported in Table 4.1.
The results show negative coefficients on sanitary expenditure in each of the eight specifica-
tions. However, the effect is much weaker amongst the groups aged over five, with only one
result—for over 65s—significantly different from zero (at a 10% level of significance). This
may reflect the fact the death rates from these two diseases were much lower amongst other
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age groups—making it more difficult to identify the causal effect.
4.4.2 Effects of expenditure on waterborne deaths in urban regis-
tration sub-districts
Let us now limit our focus on the portion of the registration districts containing urban areas,
which will allow us to confirm that we are capturing a causal effect by using nearby rural
areas as a control group for the urban areas. Table 4.3 presents the results of the analysis
focusing on waterborne (cholera and diarrhea) deaths in urban sub-districts. As above, all
variables are standardized and so the coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of a
one standard increase in the independent variable in terms of standard deviations of the
dependent variable.
Table 4.2: Estimated effect of sanitary expenditure on mortality of different
age groups 1871–1890 (All coefficients standardized)
DV=waterborne mortality rate in registration districts
Aged Under 5 Aged 5–20 Aged 20–65 Aged over 65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.14*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Tax base p.c. -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Gas spend p.c. -0.09* -0.08* 0.06 0.10 0.12* 0.13** 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged DV N Y N Y N Y N Y
Obs. 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830
No. Districts 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by district, and are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Specifications (1)–(3) include all registration districts containing any urban areas. Speci-
fication (1) includes only sanitary expenditure per capita as a dependent variable (in addition
to the fixed effects). Specification (2) includes the set of basic control variables (population,
population density, etc.), while specification (3) adds the additional controls to account for
town-level wealth and urbanization. Specifications (4)–(6) include only those registration dis-
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tricts that also include rural areas, allowing us to correct for district-level mortality trends,
as discussed above. The three specifications are the same as (1) to (3), with the addition of
the control for rural mortality within the district in each specification.
The results show consistent evidence that sanitary expenditure led to statistically signifi-
cant and sizable effects on mortality from waterborne diseases. Further the estimated size of
this effect is consistent across the six specifications, with a one standard deviation increase
in expenditure estimated to lead to between a 0.11 and 0.14 standard deviation decrease in
mortality rates.
Table 4.3: Effect of sanitary spending on death rates in urban registration
sub-districts 1871–1890 (All coefficients standardized)
DV=mortality rate in urban sub-districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV=Mortality from cholera and diarrhea
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.10** -0.14*** -0.14** -0.13**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Tax base p.c. -0.08 -0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Gas spend p.c. -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.05)
Rural cholera/diarrhea mortality
rate
0.19*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
DV=Mortality from other causes
Sanitary spend p.c. 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.07
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 830 830 830 610 610 610
No. Districts 415 415 415 305 305 305
Full results are presented in the appendix in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering
by district, and are displayed in parentheses. Specifications (1)–(3) include all registration districts containing
any urban sub-districts. Specifications (4)–(6) include registration districts containing both rural and urban sub-
districts. Control variables include urban sub-district population, population growth, and population density;
town population and urban crowding; and district-level mortality rate from violence and percentage population
under five. Mortality from other causes includes deaths from smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, whooping cough,
and diphtheria.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The bottom panel of the Table 4.3 shows the results of running the same specifications,
but with the dependent variable as the mortality rate from other diseases (specifically small-
pox, measles, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and diphtheria). As expected the results do not
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show significant evidence that sanitary expenditure reduced mortality on these diseases. This
provides further reassurance that we are capturing a causal effect of sanitary expenditure.
4.4.3 Magnitude of the effects
These results show clear evidence that expenditure on sanitary goods reduced mortality from
waterborne disease in England. In this section, we estimate how large these effects were
compared to the the overall decline in waterborne mortality across the period of study. To
do this, we compare the predicted values from the regression specifications to the predicted
values if sanitary expenditure were zero in every district. We then estimate the proportion
of the change in mortality that would have occurred even in the absence of expenditure.
We estimate magnitudes for the total population (for registration districts and urban sub-
districts) and for different age groups. To estimate the potential range of the magnitude of
the effects we estimate three regression specifications. The first includes as control variables
district fixed effects and the set of controls relating to district characteristics. The second
specification adds the two wealth proxies (tax base per capita and gas expenditure per
capita), and the third adds a 1891 year dummy variable. The wealth proxies and the 1891
dummy variable help ensure that we are not capturing a spurious correlation with wealth or
other time-varying factors—the reason why they are included in the specifications above (the
1891 year dummy in particular is included in all the specifications). However, it may also lead
to the estimated magnitude of the effect being underestimated, since some of the variation
in expenditure across time will be attributed to these factors. For instance, if greater town
wealth leads to greater expenditure on sanitary goods, the effect may be captured by the
measure of tax base per capita, even though the spending that resulted from the growth in
wealth caused a decline in mortality rates.
Magnitudes are estimated in the following way. First, I estimate the predicted values
from each regression. I then calculate a national mortality rate by multiplying district-level
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mortality by district-level population, summing across districts, and dividing by aggregate
population. I then repeat this procedure under the counterfactual that expenditure was
equal to zero in each district. The magnitude is then estimated as:
Magnitude = 1− 1891 zero-spend mortality-1881 zero-spend mortality
1891 actual-spend mortality-1881 actual-spend mortality
Table 4.4: Percentage of mortality decline between 1871 and 1890 explained by
sanitary expenditure per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Registration districts
All ages 39% 34% 18%
Age under 5 49% 40% 23%
Age 5–20 50% 42% 20%
Age 20–65 38% 34% 14%
Age over 65 32% 37% 11%
Urban sub-districts
All ages 41% 34% 21%
District FE Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y
Wealth proxies N N Y
Controls Y Y Y
Estimates calculated using predicted values from regressions of mortality from waterborne diseases against sanitary
expenditure per capita and set of control variables as detailed in the table. The category “controls” includes variables
measuring district (urban sub-district) population, population growth, and population density; town population and
urban crowding; and district- (urban sub-district-) level mortality rate from violence and percentage district popula-
tion under five. Magnitudes are calculated as the proportion of the decline in mortality that would not have occurred
in the absence of expenditure.
The results, presented in Table 4.4 show consistent evidence that the magnitude of the
effects was large, with sanitary expenditure estimated to have accounted for approximately
18%–41% of the decline in waterborne mortality between 1871–1880 and 1881–1890. The
size of the effect is similar larger for those aged under 5—the group likely most at risk–for
whom sanitary expenditure is estimated to have accounted for between 23% and 49% of
the decline across this period. Interestingly, the inclusion of the wealth proxies does not
substantially reduce the size of the estimated magnitude, suggesting that our measures are
not capturing the effects of growing town income. However, the inclusion of a time trend
leads to a significant decrease in the estimated effect. This reflects the fact that expenditure
grew generally across districts during this period—and so by including a time trend we do
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not capture the effect of the average change in sanitary expenditure across the country.
In considering these estimates, it is important to note that we are not accounting for any
lagged effects of expenditure on mortality rates. If, as is likely, expenditure continued to have
strong effects on mortality outside of the current decade then we will be underestimating
the overall impact of sanitary investment on mortality decline.
4.5 Discussion
This paper has tested the effects of government spending on sanitation infrastructure on
mortality rates from waterborne disease in England between 1871 and 1890. During this
period local government took responsibility for improving urban environments, leading to
rapid growth in expenditure on public goods such as clean water supply, sewer systems and
street paving and cleaning. The results show that governments’ spending on these local
public goods contributed significantly to the reduction in mortality from waterborne disease,
specifically deaths from cholera and diarrhea.
The fact that this spending was effective suggests that the demand for these public goods
was driven by a belief that they would be effective—rather than as a form of government
capture—as emphasized in theories of public goods such as Lizzeri and Persico (2004). How-
ever, it also raises a further question: why they were not provided more broadly or more
rapidly? There was considerable variation in the extent of spending across towns, with some
areas having appalling sanitary conditions even at the end of the century. In the previ-
ous chapter I have argued that one explanation for this was the opposition of the poor to
higher taxes—since local governments had to largely fund expenditure themselves rather than
through national grants. A further part of the story, however, is which groups benefited—
i.e., experienced reduced mortality—from spending on these public goods. Future research
will address this through comparing mortality trends in rich and poor neighborhoods across
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Britain.
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4.A Data
4.A.1 Mortality data
Registration district level
Mortality data reported at registration district level are drawn from the dicennial reports
of the Registrar General for 1851–1891, which report the annual average number of deaths
by cause and by age group split by registration district. This information is obtained from
Woods (1997).
Registration sub-district level
Mortality data were collected from the Quarterly Returns of the Registrar General for the
third quarter of each year between 1871 and 1890, with the exception of 1880 and 1882. This
information was supplemented with the equivalent data for the years 1871, 1881 and 1891
which had been digitized previously by Southall (1998).
4.A.2 Financial data
Financial data are drawn from the Local Taxation Returns reported to Parliament and col-
lected in the Parliamentary Papers collection. Data is collected for all “urban sanitary
authorities” for each year from 1872 to 1900.14 This includes approximately 900 towns,
granted standardized expenditure powers under the terms of the 1872 Public Health Act.
14For 1872 the accounts are reported under the titles of Local Boards of Health and Improvement
Commissions—the bodies which were renamed Urban Sanitary Authorities in the 1872 Public Health Act.
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Defining ongoing and investment public goods expenditure
Prior to 1885 the financial data does not distinguish between one-off and ongoing expen-
diture items: as such the accounts include a number of very high expenditures, reflecting
investment activities. To separate ongoing expenditure from investment expenditure for dif-
ferent types of public good, I first identify “investment periods” by analyzing deviations in
trend expenditure in each of the following categories “sewerage and sewer systems”, “water
supply”, “highways, watering and scavenging”, and “gas supply”. A year is identified as the
beginning of an investment period for each good if:
1. Expenditure per capita exceeds the median percentile of expenditure per capita (across
all towns and years) in the relevant category; and either:
• the town started expenditure on the relevant good in that period; or
• there is a 100% year-on-year growth in expenditure on the good, and the expen-
diture p.c. exceeds the median per capita spending for the town in the next ten
years; or
• the two previous years of data are missing, and the expenditure p.c. exceeds the
median per capita spending for the town in the next ten years; or
• the level of expenditure p.c. is higher than the previous year and twice the median
per capita spending for the town in the next ten years.
The years following the start of an investment period are identified as investment periods if
either:
1. expenditure p.c. is greater than the previous period; or
2. the expenditure p.c. exceeds the median per capita spending for the town in the next
ten years; and either:
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• the expenditure is twice the town’s average expenditure over the period; or
• the level of expenditure exceeds the median percentile of expenditure per capita
(across all towns and years) in the relevant category.
4.A.3 Linking towns to registration districts
Each town is linked to a registration sub-district using information reported in the 1881
census, Vol II. This report splits the population of each town according to registration sub-
district. For example, of a total town population of 10,000 it identifies that 4,000 lived in
sub-district A, 3,500 in sub-district B, and 2,500 in sub-district C. To aggregate expenditure
data at the level of registration district, expenditure is allocated to each registration district
proportionally to the portion of the town population that falls in each district. That is, if
85% of the town live in district X, and 15% in district Y, then 85% of town expenditure is
assigned to district X and 15% to district Y. Registration district-level expenditure is then
calculated through summing the spending amounts for all towns (whole or part) within the
district.
A further complication is that the boundaries of registration districts changed over time,
with some added and others removed. To account for this, I adjust all mortality data to
the 1881 boundaries by first identifying all sub-district boundary changes (using the reports
of the Registrar General) and then created a synthetic district based on population weight.
That is, deaths in each year were reassigned to the 1881 district based on the population of
the actual district reporting that lived in the 1881 district boundary in 1881. For instance,
if two equally-sized districts merged in 1885, mortality data from the new district after this
point would be split evenly between the two synthetic districts.
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4.A.4 Census data
Information on town and district population, number of houses and area was collected from
decennial census reports. The collected data was supplemented by additional information
for registration districts using the parish-level census information for 1871 and 1891 digitized
by Southall (2004).
4.B Additional empirical results
4.B.1 Full tables
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Table 4.5: Effect of sanitary spending on district cholera and diarrhea death
rates 1871–1890
DV=Mortality rate under 5 DV=Mortality rate all ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.11** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.11**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
1891 dummy -0.37*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.54***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Tax base p.c. -0.11 -0.11 -0.21** -0.09 -0.09 -0.20**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Gas spend p.c. -0.09* -0.08* -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Urban popn growth 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10* 0.10* 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
District violent death rate 0.06** 0.06** 0.05* 0.08** 0.08** 0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
% popn under 5 -0.13 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
District population -0.25 -0.31 -0.26 -0.28 -0.35* -0.22
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
Town population 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.06
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15)
Town crowding -0.20* -0.19* -0.17 -0.24** -0.23** -0.19*
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
% popn in towns 0.31** 0.33*** 0.39*** 0.25** 0.28** 0.35***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Lag U5 waterborne mortality -0.09 -0.14**
(0.06) (0.05)
Lag waterborne mortality -0.08* -0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.29***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
County time trends N N N Y N N N Y
Obs. 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830
No. Districts 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by district, and are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.6: Effect of sanitary spending on district-level pulmonary tuberculosis
death rates 1871–1890
DV=Mortality rate under 5 DV=Mortality rate all ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.12* -0.08 -0.13 -0.07 -0.06* 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1891 dummy -0.42*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.78*** -0.92*** -0.89***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08)
Tax base p.c. -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14** -0.14** -0.11
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Gas spend p.c. -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Urban popn growth 0.05 -0.01 0.10 -0.07* -0.07* -0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
District violent death rate 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
% popn under 5 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.19** -0.19** -0.26***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
District population 0.45 0.29 0.06 0.58** 0.59** 0.60**
(0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26)
Town population -0.49* -0.39 -0.31 -0.68*** -0.70*** -0.67***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
Town crowding -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13 -0.16*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
% popn in towns 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11)
Lag Under5 TB mortality -0.34*** -0.35***
(0.07) (0.06)
o.time 40 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Lag TB mortality 0.05 -0.08
(0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.52***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
County time trends N N N Y N N N Y
Obs. 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830
No. Districts 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by district, and are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.7: Effect of sanitary spending on urban sub-district cholera and
diarhoea death rates 1871–1890
DV=Urban mortality rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sanitary spend p.c. -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.10** -0.14*** -0.14** -0.13**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
1891 dummy -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
Urban RSD population -0.21 -0.23 -0.14 -0.18
(0.32) (0.32) (0.59) (0.60)
Urban RSD popn growth 0.11** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Urban popn density -0.71* -0.70* -2.03 -1.97
(0.37) (0.36) (1.45) (1.46)
Town population 0.38 0.41 0.87* 0.89*
(0.37) (0.36) (0.50) (0.49)
Town crowding -0.31*** -0.33*** -0.13 -0.14
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
District violent death rate 0.07* 0.07* 0.09** 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
% popn under 5 -0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Tax base p.c. -0.08 -0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Gas spend p.c. -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.05)
Rural cholera/diarrhea mortality
rate
0.19*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** -0.09*** -0.39 -0.39
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.27) (0.27)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 830 830 830 610 610 610
No. Districts 415 415 415 305 305 305
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by district, and are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.8: Effect of sanitary spending on urban sub-district other death rates
1871-1890
DV=Urban mortality rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sanitary spend p.c. 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.07
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
1891 dummy -0.70*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.58*** -0.43*** -0.42***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14)
Urban RSD population 0.10 0.05 1.88** 2.19***
(0.37) (0.35) (0.75) (0.77)
Urban RSD popn growth 0.19*** 0.16** 0.28*** 0.27***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Urban popn density 0.33 0.41 -0.93 -1.91
(0.68) (0.66) (1.75) (1.83)
Town population -0.40 -0.27 -1.09 -1.03
(0.38) (0.35) (0.67) (0.64)
Town crowding -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.43** -0.38*
(0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21)
District violent death rate 0.13* 0.12* 0.19** 0.16*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
% popn under 5 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.17
(0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.23)
Tax base p.c. -0.17 -0.07
(0.15) (0.18)
Gas spend p.c. -0.23** -0.27**
(0.09) (0.12)
Rural other mortality rate 0.12** 0.11** 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.08 -0.09
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.36) (0.37)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
1891 dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 830 830 830 610 610 610
No. Districts 415 415 415 305 305 305
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering by district, and are displayed in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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